


# Armenian Review



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Cover: Photograph of L.C. Westenenk, one of two Europeans appointed governor-general for Western Armenia in 1914.

Design by Tatul Sonentz-Papazian.

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# The Question of Armenian Reforms in 1913-1914

W.J. van der Dussen

## INTRODUCTION: THE PERIOD FROM 1878 TO 1895

On August 8, 1914 L.C. Westenenk, the Dutch inspector-general for east Anatolia, who was about to leave for Erzerum, received a letter from Talaat, Turkey's minister of the interior, saying: "I request you please to postpone your departure, since the general mobilization, which also includes the officials, and the present serious circumstances, make the application of the sanctioned reforms impossible."<sup>1</sup> This short communication, resulting from the outbreak of the First World War in which Turkey was soon to get involved, was issued six days after the Turkish alliance with Germany; it marked the resolute end of the "Armenian Question," which had played a major role during the last decades in the politics of the Great Powers with regard to the Ottoman Empire. It also meant the definite closing of the doors for the European Powers — with the exception of Germany and its allies. A little more than eight months later this would lead to the organized Genocide of the Armenian people, in which the same Talaat, who had informed Westenenk of the end of his mission, would play such a sinister part.

The mission of the Dutchman Westenenk and the Norwegian Hoff, who on April 15, 1914 had been appointed inspectors-general for the six eastern vilayets of Turkey, was the culmination of a protracted and often fateful involvement of the Great Powers with the treatment of the Armenians within the Ottoman Empire. This involvement had started with the preliminary peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1888, signed at San Stefano on March 3, 1878, which included, as article 16:

As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise

<sup>1</sup>See L.C. Westenenk, *Diary Concerning the Armenian Mission*, pp. 29-89 of this issue.

to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.<sup>2</sup>

This article aroused the apprehension of the British government, then under the leadership of the conservative Prime Minister Disraeli, since it feared a too large Russian influence in the east of Turkey. This led to a "Convention of Defensive Alliance" between England and Turkey, signed on June 4, 1878, the so-called "Cyprus Convention," in which England guaranteed the integrity of Ottoman territories in Asia in exchange for the occupation and administration of Cyprus by England and the promise by the sultan "to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories."<sup>3</sup>

The question of reforms in favor of the Armenians in Turkey was also discussed at the Congress of Berlin, taking place in the summer of 1878 with the participation of the six Great Powers: Germany, England, Russia, France, Italy and Austria-Hungary; German Chancellor Bismarck acted as the "honest broker." The Congress produced the following formulation of the same issue, as article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878:

The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and the Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.<sup>4</sup>

Through this article the question of the treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was internationalized and would figure from then on — though with intervals — on the agenda of the Eastern policy of the Great Powers. The Armenians themselves, however, were more the object — one could sometimes even say the victim — of this involvement, than an active participant in the efforts to improve their situation. In this respect the Berlin Congress was already ominous, since an Armenian delegation tried in vain to obtain guarantees for improvements and reforms. Article 61, in fact, was a drawback as compared with article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano, since the demanded reforms would only have to be put into effect after the withdrawal of the Russian troops and not prior to it, as was the case in the latter treat-

<sup>2</sup>E. Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty* (London, 1891), p. 2686.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2723.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2796.



ty. The reforms, accordingly, remained a dead letter. In 1880 an attempt was made by the Great Powers to have Turkey meet its obligations: on June 11 an identic note was sent to the Porte saying that "nothing has been done by the Sublime Porte to make known the steps which it may have taken in order to meet the stipulations of article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin" and that, therefore, "the complete and immediate execution" of that article was demanded.<sup>5</sup>

Nothing was done, however, either by the Ottoman Empire to implement its duties, or by the Powers to force Turkey to have them done. Only after the Sasun massacres of autumn 1894 and after an international commission of investigation had been set up in this connection, did England, France, and Russia offer on May 11, 1895 a note to the Porte in which a scheme of reforms for the six eastern vilayets was worked out. It demanded among others a High Commissioner to supervise the application of reforms and the creation of a Permanent Commission of Control at Constantinople.<sup>6</sup>

After a few days of serious disorders and killings in Constantinople — starting on September 30 when a mass demonstration took place, organized by the Hunchakian party — and after the Great Powers had sent on October 6 on the occasion of these events a collective note to the Porte,<sup>7</sup> the latter took the initiative and announced on October 20, 1895 a plan of reforms, sanctioned in an imperial *irade*, for the eastern vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Mamuret-ul-Aziz (Kharput) and Sivas. According to this plan Muslim officials at various levels would be assisted by non-Muslims (*mouavins*) and administrative functions would be entrusted to Muslim and non-Muslim subjects according to the proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims in each vilayet. Arrangements would be made for the participation of non-Muslims in the police and gendarmerie, a Permanent Commission of Control would be installed at the Sublime Porte composed half of Muslims and non-Muslims, and a Muslim inspector-general would be appointed to attend to the carrying out of the reforms, accompanied by a non-Muslim assistant.<sup>8</sup>

This plan of reforms indeed looks impressive and, had it been implemented seriously, Armenians in Turkey would certainly have been able to prosper. Such a plan could only be realized, though, in a modern, developed, effective, and democratic state, which must also be willing to implement its own plans. The Ottoman Empire under Abdul Hamid, however, was far from fulfilling these requirements: it resem-

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2960.

<sup>6</sup>Das Staatsarchiv. *Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart*, vol. 58 (Leipzig, 1896), pp. 92-95.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 160-162.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 164-170.

bled a living fossil, disintegrating rapidly, in all respects backward, but also increasingly hostile to its Armenian population and not at all willing to take their complaints, let alone reforms, seriously. With regard to the reforms, which the Porte had to adopt under foreign pressure, one can only come to the cynical conclusion that they even led to more serious persecutions.<sup>9</sup> For it was indeed after the adoption of the plan of reforms that massacres of Armenians took place all over the country on a massive scale in 1895 and 1896.

#### THE QUESTION OF REFORMS IN 1913-1914

When the question of reforms in east Anatolia came to the fore once more in 1913 — again within the context of the politics of the Great Powers — the situation was different from the one in 1878 or 1895. Not only had the regime of Abdul Hamid come to an end, but since 1908 the Young Turks had replaced him. Their Committee of Union and Progress was inspired by Western ideas, first of a liberal and democratic nature. But gradually they became more nationalistic, while the movement ended with the almost dictatorial power of the triumvirate Enver, Talaat and Jemal. With men like these the Powers had at least to reckon with more self-confident and shrewd politicians than during the time of Abdul Hamid.

In 1912-1913 the Ottoman Empire faced serious crises; it was involved in two Balkan wars, which resulted in the loss of almost all its European possessions. Armenians, stirred by the successes of the various Balkan peoples, were of the opinion that the time was ripe for their problems to be put on the international agenda again. In contrast to the situation in the Balkans, however, they not only lived in the Turkish heartland, but were also spread over a large area and nowhere could claim an absolute majority. Though complete independence was hardly feasible, reforms certainly were. In 1913-1914 this question played a prominent part both in Armenian politics and in the politics of the Great Powers, especially after the Balkan wars had come to an end (this was realized in May 1913 at a conference of ambassadors in London).

The Armenian Question had changed since 1878 and 1895, not only because the shape of the Ottoman Empire had been drastically changed, but also because the Great Powers were now organized into the two opposing blocs: the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) and the Triple Entente (England, France, Russia). With regard to the revival of the Armenian Question in 1913-1914 one has,

<sup>9</sup>In Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia. The Survival of a Nation* (London, 1980), p. 169, a very clarifying model is given of the "vicious circle" of Ottoman brutality, introduction of reforms under foreign pressure, failure, growth of revolutionary activity on the part of the Armenians, leading to more Ottoman brutality.

therefore, to take into account not only the opposition between Turks and Armenians, but also the various rivalries between the Great Powers. This made the whole affair very complicated, especially since besides the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente there was also the traditional rivalry between England and Russia with regard to the Middle East (expressed, for instance, by the Cyprus Convention of 1878).

For various reasons Russia had a special interest in Asiatic Turkey, reasons which were also involved in its dealings with the Armenian Question. Russia was, of course, traditionally interested in the Straits and would at the least not allow another Power to control its passage.<sup>10</sup> It was also interested in the Armenians in Turkey, since on the Russian side of the border lived a sizable number of Armenians, and Russia did not want unrest within its borders. Russia had also had difficulties with its Armenian population and was afraid that troubles in eastern Turkey might influence developments in Russian Armenia. It was therefore a Russian interest to have a certain influence on the developments in Turkish Armenia and to keep peace and tranquility in that region.<sup>11</sup> Another factor was of course the Armenian catholicos, who resided on Russian territory at Etchmiadzin.<sup>12</sup>

The Russian intentions with regard to Turkish Armenia were highly distrusted, however, not only by Turkey, but also by the Great Powers, in particular Germany. It was feared that a Russian involvement in Turkish-Armenian affairs would constitute a mere pretext for and a prelude to an eventual occupation of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Whatever the character of the ultimate Russian intentions, it can safely be argued that an occupation of eastern Turkey by Russia would never have been accepted by the Great Powers.

That does not mean, though, that the future of Turkey was viewed optimistically. On the contrary, the general feeling was that in the long run Asiatic Turkey might be broken up, as had happened already with its European part. "Asiatic Turkey cannot maintain itself any more under its own steam," the German ambassador in Constantinople, von Wangenheim, wrote to Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg,<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup>F. Stieve, ed., *Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1911-1914* (cited hereafter as *Iswolski*), vol. 3 (Berlin, 1924), nr. 1157/p. 377.

<sup>11</sup>*Documents Diplomatiques Français (1871-1914)*, 3<sup>e</sup> Série (1911-1914) (cited hereafter as *D.D.F.*), vol. 7 (Paris, 1934), nr. 45/p. 51; G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol. 10, part 1, *The Near and Middle East on the Eve of War* (London, 1936) (cited hereafter as *British Documents*), nr. 505/p. 449.

<sup>12</sup>For the background on the Russian attitude, see R.H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914," in *The American Historical Review*, 53 (1948):486-491.

<sup>13</sup>*Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, vol. 38, *Neue Gefahrenzonen im Orient* (Berlin, 1927) (cited hereafter as *G.P.*), nr. 15312/p. 43.



while the French plenipotentiary in Constantinople said: "As many, I am of the opinion that the Turkish Empire is finished, both in Asia and Europe; but don't we have an interest to prolongue its agony, in order that its succession is not partitioned now to the detriment of us?"<sup>14</sup>

The latter conclusion indeed illustrates well the general attitude of the Great Powers: none of them — including Russia — wanted, at least in the immediate future, a partition of Asiatic Turkey. However, because of the growing unrest among Armenians in eastern Turkey and the incapacity of the Porte to deal with the unstable situation in that region, the Powers considered a serious plan of reforms imperative.<sup>15</sup>

It was the Russian government that took the initiative with regard to the Armenian Question, in collaboration with the Armenian Catholicos George V. At the end of 1912 there was a correspondence between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov and his ambassador in Constantinople, de Giers, about the desirability of raising the matter of reforms in Turkish Armenia. Sazonov also sounded out the English and French governments with regard to this subject, taking the reforms as contemplated in article 61 of the Berlin Congress as the starting point. In addition, the catholicos entrusted the Egyptian-Armenian Boghos Nubar Pasha with the mission to contact the various European cabinets about the matter and to create public support for it.<sup>16</sup>

Boghos Nubar concentrated his activities in Paris and on February 8, 1913 the German ambassador to France informed Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg that Boghos Nubar had paid him a visit.<sup>17</sup> He had assured him that the Armenian aim was not a separation from Turkey, not even autonomy, but only an improvement of conditions for the Armenian people. The leading Armenians did not want a Russian custody or mastery, according to Nubar, and preferred to stay under Turkish rule. One only wanted the concern of the Great Powers, since it was only they who could guarantee the well-being of the Armenians. The Turks would also be convinced at last of the usefulness of Arme-

<sup>14</sup>D.D.F. 7, nr. 6/p. 11.

<sup>15</sup>With regard to the statements of policy concerned, see: B. von Siebert, ed., *Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel*, vol. 3 (1913 and 1914) (Berlin/Leipzig, 1928), nr. 960/p. 188, nr. 969/p. 197; L. Bittner and H. Uebersberger, eds., *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914* (Vienna/Leipzig, 1930) (cited hereafter as O.U.A.P.), nr. 8181/p. 25, nr. 8772/pp. 392-394, nr. 9068/pp. 630-631; *British Documents*, nr. 532/p. 470, nr. 539/p. 479, nr. 542/p. 484, nr. 550/p. 490, nr. 552/p. 492, nr. 586/p. 537; G.P., nr. 15299/p. 30, nr. 15312/pp. 43-45, nr. 15317/p. 55, nr. 15324/p. 65; D.D.F. 7, nr. 6/pp. 10-11, nr. 264/p. 284; D.D.F. 8, nr. 118/pp. 141-142.

<sup>16</sup>G.P., nr. 15282/pp. 3-4; *British Documents*, nr. 475/p. 424; Davison, "Armenian Crisis," pp. 489-490; A. Mandelstam, *Le sort de l'Empire Ottoman* (Lausanne/Paris, 1917), pp. 207-211.

<sup>17</sup>G.P., nr. 15286/pp. 8-10.

nian reforms, since the pretext for interventions would be precluded by them and they would support the status quo. The question of reforms could only be set in motion, Nubar said, when Germany got involved. The ambassador answered that he could not give Nubar any promises in this respect, but agreed with the view that the Armenian Question could not be solved by one of the power blocs. This indeed corresponds with the German view expressed before that the concern for Armenian affairs could not be left to the Triple Entente.<sup>18</sup>

On March 13 the Russian ambassador in Paris, Iswolski, also wrote Sazonov about a visit of Boghos Nubar. This time Nubar said that the Armenians placed their hopes completely on Russian support and that they would follow the directions of the Russian government. He also reiterated, however, that there was no question of autonomy for the Armenians, nor of a change of citizenship.<sup>19</sup>

In the meantime the Porte took action as well. In order to forestall a special reform of the eastern vilayets an administrative reform was announced in March 1913 for all the vilayets, which introduced a considerable degree of decentralization.<sup>20</sup> Soon after this reform was given an international dimension: In April 1913 Turkey asked England for 17 officials to help her with the introduction of reforms in the whole Empire, "aimed at raising the moral and material level of its nations without distinction of race or religion." The Ottoman Empire asked England specifically for inspectors of the gendarmerie, justice, agriculture, forests, and public works, as well as for seven gendarmerie officers and for an adviser and inspector-general for the Interior Department. That at the end of the Turkish request reference was made to the dispositions of the Cyprus Convention made clear what Turkey had in mind with this move: to set Russia and England at odds with regard to the Armenian Question.<sup>21</sup>

England, however, was hesitant to accept the Turkish proposal and did not want to take steps in this matter without consulting Russia. The Russian reaction was, for obvious reasons, negative. Sazonov was of the opinion that the question of English officials should be part of the total project of reforms to be introduced in Asia Minor and in this connection he would prefer that all three Entente powers — Russia, England and France — participate in it. He also proposed to have this question discussed by the ambassadors of the three countries in Constantinople.<sup>22</sup> Sir Edward Grey, the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, was opposed, however, to the Russian idea of having only Russia,

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15283/p. 4.

<sup>19</sup>Iswolski 3, nr. 765/pp. 91-92.

<sup>20</sup>Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 211; *G.P.*, nr. 15295/pp. 26-28.

<sup>21</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 479/pp. 427-429.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 486/p. 434.

France and England involved in the question of reforms: in his opinion this should be the work of all the Powers.<sup>23</sup> A few days afterward he conferred with the German ambassador about the subject and they fully agreed on the desirability of a comprehensive scheme of reforms for Asiatic Turkey. There was also no objection from the side of Germany to the provisional lending of some British officers for the gendarmerie (England was not willing to provide the other officials asked for by Turkey).<sup>24</sup>

So the stage was set for an international consultation on the Armenian Question, in which all the Great Powers were involved, since France, Austria-Hungary and Italy followed their respective allies. One could say that this was partly the result of the Turkish request for English officials — indeed an unintended consequence of this initiative — since it stirred English, Russian and German reactions and forced them to take up certain positions in relation with reforms to be organized in eastern Turkey.

Russia was keen to take the initiative in this affair and on June 7, 1913 a communication was sent by Sazonov to the Powers with the proposal to have the subject discussed by the ambassadors of the Powers in Constantinople, taking the project of 1895 as the starting point.<sup>25</sup> This proposal was accepted. Though Germany wanted a Turkish delegate to be present at the discussions, the idea was given up because of Russia's strong objections to it.<sup>26</sup> At the end of June an *avant projet* was sent out, drafted by the first dragoman of the Russian embassy at Constantinople, André Mandelstam, in which a plan of reforms for Turkish Armenia was worked out.

The plan was far-reaching and consisted of 22 articles. The six vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharput and Sivas would be organized into one province, governed by an Ottoman Christian or preferably a European, appointed by the sultan for five years with the approval of the Powers. His authority would be considerable: he would be the head of all the administrative officials, the police and gendarmerie; and upon his request the military forces would be put at his disposal in order to maintain order in the province. The governor-general would be assisted by an advisory council of Muslims, Christians and Europeans and the Provincial Assembly would consist of an equal number of Muslims and Christians.<sup>27</sup>

This time, as a counter-move, the Porte issued on July 1 a new

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 489/p. 436.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 499/pp. 444-445; *G.P.*, nr. 15324/pp. 65-66.

<sup>25</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 505/p. 449; *D.D.F.* 7, nr. 45/pp. 51-52.

<sup>26</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 523/pp. 463-464.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 515/pp. 455-459; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 218-222.

reform scheme of its own and sent it to the Powers.<sup>28</sup> As might be expected, this scheme differed considerably from the one proposed by Mandelstam: the reform was related to the whole Empire, which would be divided into six "sectors of general inspection," headed by an inspector-general. The two "oriental vilayets" would have foreign inspectors-general. They would be appointed, however, by the Turkish government without interference from the Powers.

On July 3 the Powers started a conference on the Armenian reforms at Yeniköy. All six Powers participated with delegates, under the presidency of the doyen of the corps diplomatique at Constantinople, the Austrian ambassador Panfili. From its opening moment the conference was confronted with the problem of the two sharply contrasting Russian and Turkish reform plans. Wangenheim was critical of the Mandelstam plan, but did not want to rebuff the Armenians.<sup>29</sup> He opposed the idea of an administratively independent Armenian area under Russian control, since in his opinion that would have repercussions in other areas as well.<sup>30</sup> For England the traditional opposition to Russia in the Middle East apparently prevailed against its status as an ally, for Grey made it clear to the Russian government that he was of the opinion that two conditions were essential to the success of a reform plan: unanimity among the Powers and the acceptance of their scheme by Turkey, without coercion.<sup>31</sup> Since France agreed with the English point of view,<sup>32</sup> it was no surprise that the conference at Yeniköy ended in failure (there had been eight sessions, the last one on July 24, 1913).<sup>33</sup> All the Powers were suspicious of the Russian policy; one Power even thought that Russia wanted to have a Russian governor-general of the Armenian provinces and that this would lead to the eventual partition of the Asiatic provinces,<sup>34</sup> but in this connection it should be kept in mind that Russia was under strong pressure from its own Armenian population. The catholicos had even asked for an annexation of the Armenian vilayets by Russia, but this idea was strongly opposed by Sazonov.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>28</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 538/pp. 474-479.

<sup>29</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15347/pp. 89-95.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15337/p. 78.

<sup>31</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 547/p. 488.

<sup>32</sup>*D.D.F.* 7, nr. 331/pp. 368-369.

<sup>33</sup>The minutes of the meetings are reprinted in the so-called *Orange Book* (Petersburg, 1915), pp. 190-272. The first half of the *Orange Book* consists of documents (all of them in Russian) related to the reforms in Turkish Armenia, from November 26, 1912 until May 10, 1914. For a report on the conference at Yeniköy, see also Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 227-234.

<sup>34</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 535/p. 472.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 494/p. 441; *D.D.F.* 7, nr. 331/p. 369.

Through the failure of the Yeniköy conference the various positions and the situation in general had in any case become more clear. It was apparent, for instance, that Russia was unable to put through its plans alone. The most notable aspect in this connection was, of course, that it had become evident that Russia could not rely on its ally England in the matter of the reforms. This made even Russia doubt the use of the Entente.<sup>36</sup> The advantage of this development was, however, that in this way the possibility of an opening was made toward Germany and the usual opposition of the two power blocs was therefore transversed. At the same time, after the failure of the conference, Ambassador Wangenheim displayed a much more conciliatory attitude and he indeed considered it urgent that an initiative be taken in order that the question of Armenian reforms not fail again and a bad impression not be left upon Armenians.<sup>37</sup> He even had contact with Dr. Johannes Lepsius, the well-known German Armenophile, who stayed in Constantinople in the beginning of August.<sup>38</sup> On August 10, 1913 Wangenheim reported that Lepsius had negotiated with Armenian representatives and had assured that Armenians in principle would abandon their support for the main points contained in Mandelstam's proposal. But Wangenheim also demanded that the Powers take action at the Porte for the execution of the Turkish plan in combination with those points of the Russian project that had been unanimously accepted at the Yeniköy conference. The following points were also added: cooperation of the Powers concerning the choice of the inspectors-general, parity instead of proportionality, regional military service, and settlement of *mohajirs* (Muslim refugees from the Balkans) only with the approval of the inspector-general. In addition, Wangenheim reported that the Grand Vizir had knowledge of Lepsius's negotiations with the Armenians and that he had Lepsius meet Mandelstam, in order to prevent Russian distrust.<sup>39</sup>

On September 15 Wangenheim had a meeting with his Russian colleague de Giers in order to work out a compromise on the reforms. As a result, Russia accepted the Turkish idea of dividing the eastern provinces into two zones and Germany accepted the idea of equal representation of nationalities instead of a proportional one: Wangenheim and de Giers also decided that they would initially negotiate separately with the Grand Vizir, Said Halim.<sup>40</sup> Within a week a final compromise had been worked out. The main points were: the Porte applies to the Powers for the recommendation of two inspectors-general for the two

<sup>36</sup>*D.D.F.* 8, nr. 99/pp. 118-119.

<sup>37</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15375/p. 126.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15376/p. 130.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15377/p. 132.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15386/p. 143.

sectors of eastern Anatolia; each would be supported by an elected council and the distribution of all offices between Muslims and Christians would be equal in number; and the Great Powers would supervise the application of reforms.<sup>41</sup>

The Grand Vizir had serious objections to the Russo-German plan. He told Wangenheim that according to this plan the inspectors-general still appeared as delegates of the Powers, while the Porte and his party were of the opinion that they should remain Turkish officials, who could be dismissed in case of a conflict with the Porte.<sup>42</sup> It was clear that Turkey was not happy with the Russo-German initiative and Said Halim even bitterly complained to the French ambassador about the foreign pressure put upon Turkey.<sup>43</sup> Matters became more complicated during the negotiations as it became apparent that the Grand Vizir was not free and was apparently getting more dependent on the Committee of Union and Progress. As it was expressed by Wangenheim: "The problem is that we don't have to negotiate with the Sultan or a personality of superior prestige . . . but with the Committee, that means a group which is ruled by ideas, not by personalities. At present the prevailing thought in the Committee is to have Turkey rather ruined than to continue to have it further under the political control of the Powers."<sup>44</sup>

In November Grand Vizir Said Halim came with a plan, proposing among others that the two (Turkish) inspectors-general would be assisted by a foreign advisor.<sup>45</sup> On this basis again another plan of 16 points was worked out by de Giers.<sup>46</sup> (Strangely enough de Giers told the English ambassador, Mallet, that he had drawn up this plan in consultation with Wangenheim, while the latter reported that de Giers had not consulted him about it.)<sup>47</sup>

The negotiations entered a critical phase. Germany and Russia were now on a par with regard to the required reforms, acting in fact with a mandate from the other Powers. Grand Vizir Said Halim was also willing to cooperate and showed a conciliatory attitude. The problem was, however, that the latter had to cope with serious resistance from the Committee of Union and Progress, which apparently opposed any foreign influence. Jemal, for instance, who was, according to Wangenheim, "the decisive personality of the Committee in all Armenian questions," expressed at a dinner at the German embassy his

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15390/p. 146; *British Documents*, nr. 568/p. 517.

<sup>42</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15396/p. 150.

<sup>43</sup>*D.D.F.* 8, nr. 296/pp. 376-377.

<sup>44</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15399/pp. 153-154.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15405/p. 161; *British Documents*, nr. 581/p. 527.

<sup>46</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 584/pp. 531-533; *G.P.*, nr. 15408/pp. 166-168.

<sup>47</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 584/p. 530; *G.P.*, nr. 15408/p. 165.

strong opposition to any European intervention.<sup>48</sup> The difficult position of the Grand Vizir is brought out clearly by the fact that he asked Wangenheim "as a personal friend" (sic!) for advice concerning the difficult dilemma in which he found himself in the Armenian Question against his party and the Powers. During the same conversation Said Halim did explicitly recognize, however, that article 61 of the Congress of Berlin had provided for the right of control by the Powers.<sup>49</sup>

On December 1, 1913 the English ambassador Mallet also reported to minister Grey a conversation he had with the Grand Vizir. On this occasion Mallet expressed the good intentions of the Powers, but also of the Armenians. Mallet reported:

I said that the acting Armenian Patriarch, on the occasion of his official visit to me, had told me that the Armenians had no thought of independence, they wanted to live under Ottoman rule and if their lives and property were guaranteed they would prove the most loyal subjects of the Sultan. They had so often been disappointed in the shape of foreign advisors, they could not be expected to have much faith in the efficacy of reforms. The impression in Europe, and especially in England, where people were deeply interested in the question, would be deplorable, if after all that had happened the assistance of Europe was refused. There was no question of coercion — of imposing reforms by force — but His Majesty's Government were sincerely anxious to help the Porte, and if their friendly advice was set aside it would be felt in England as a rebuff. . . . His Highness took no exception to my remarks and finally said that he would do his best to meet the Russian proposals in a conciliatory spirit. I am not, however, very hopeful of his accepting the revised project as it stands. The situation has changed very much in the last ten days and strong feeling is being shown against any European intervention in the matter of reforms.

Mallet also reported that the relation between Muslims and Armenians was getting more tense:

In the meantime there are indications of rising feeling against the Armenians. The new Armenian Patriarch has received a threatening letter signed by the "Young Musulmans" warning His Beatitude against interfering in matters concerning the nation and the Government, and intimating that should he not follow this advice the "Young Musulmans" will not be slow to carry out the decisions already taken in the matter. Two days ago an Armenian priest was twice stoned by a band of Musulman youths in a quarter of the capital while the same day an Armenian church was daubed red by apparently a similar hand. I have the honour to enclose a translation of an article in today's *Tasvir-i-efkâr* which tries to make out that the question of reforms in the Eastern Anatolian Vilayets is one of Christian Europe versus Islam. Articles of this nature tend to inflame Moslem sentiment and to obscure the fact that Europe's desire to assist in the work of reform is prompted by the conviction that such reforms are as much in the interests of the Moslem Turks and Kurds as of the Christian Armenians.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup>G.P., nr. 15406/p. 162.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15409/pp. 168-169.

<sup>50</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 586/pp. 534-535.



Though the question of reforms seemed to have come to a deadlock because of the Turkish attitude, quite suddenly the atmosphere cleared up and Turkey came to an agreement with Germany and Russia. On December 25, 1913 Wangenheim and de Giers had a joint discussion with the Grand Vizir. The latter came now with the proposal to have two European inspectors-general appointed instead of European advisors, in order to overcome difficulties in case of differences of opinion between a European advisor and an Ottoman inspector-general.<sup>51</sup> When de Giers insisted that his 16 point plan would be adopted, Said Halim answered that with regard to certain points he would even go further than these.<sup>52</sup> On December 29 the Grand Vizir informed Wangenheim and de Giers that the Council of Ministers had authorized him to continue accordingly to these plans.<sup>53</sup>

A final agreement was within reach when at the last moment Russia caused some troubles: de Giers, who was at the point of going on leave, was quite unexpectedly instructed by his government to make some new demands to the Turkish government, among others that the names of the inspectors-general were to be submitted to the Powers and that legal reforms should be introduced.<sup>54</sup> The reason for this move might be found in the Russian annoyance caused by the news about the impending military mission of the German Liman von Sanders and the fact that Enver, who was very much German-oriented, had been appointed Turkish Minister of War.<sup>55</sup>

When de Giers eventually went on leave on January 19 no final agreement had been arranged yet. Not only did the countries of the Triple Alliance criticize Russia for its intransigence, but England as well, and even the Armenian patriarch, asked the Russian chargé d'affaires, Gulkevich, who took the place of de Giers, to conclude his negotiations without delay.<sup>56</sup>

At last Gulkevich and the Grand Vizir and Minister of Foreign Affairs Said Halim signed on February 8, 1914 an agreement saying that at the moment of the appointment of the inspectors-general the Porte would address to the Powers a note explaining the competence of the inspectors-general and certain measures to be taken in the regions concerned. On the same day Gulkevich telegraphed the news to Sazonov and said that it was to be preferred that the agreement had the

<sup>51</sup>On the dinner at the German embassy, referred to before, Jemal had already suggested that two European inspectors-general, chosen by Turkey, would be acceptable to the Committee (see *G.P.*, nr. 15406/p. 162).

<sup>52</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15412/pp. 170-171.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15413/p. 171.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 15417/p. 174; *British Documents*, nr. 588/p. 540.

<sup>55</sup>*O.U.A.P.*, nr. 9202/pp. 738-739; *G.P.*, nr. 15417/p. 174.

<sup>56</sup>*D.D.F.* 9, nr. 225/p. 284, nr. 233/p. 291.

character of a commitment of Turkey only with regard to Russia and that its signing by the German representative as well would be prevented.<sup>57</sup> Though the note would only be sent officially by the Porte to the Powers when the inspectors-general were appointed, it was forwarded unofficially by Gulkevich to his colleagues in Constantinople.<sup>58</sup>

The note contained, among others, the following points:<sup>59</sup> two foreign inspectors-general will be placed at the head of the two sectors of eastern Anatolia (A at the head of the vilayets Erzerum, Trebizond and Sivas; B of Van, Bitlis, Kharput and Diarbekir); they will have the control of the administration, justice, police and gendarmerie of their sector; in case the public security forces should be insufficient, military forces will be put at their disposal on their request; they will have the right to dismiss officials who do not function properly and will in that case replace subaltern officials, while they have the right to present higher officials for nomination by the Turkish government; agrarian conflicts will be solved under the direct supervision of the inspectors-general; in case the posts of inspector-general were vacant during the term of ten years, the Porte will depend on the cooperation of the Great Powers for the choice of new ones; laws and regulations in each sector will be published in the local languages; the allotment to each ethnic element (*ounsour*) within the budget of public education of each vilayet will be determined in proportion to its contribution to the taxes collected for public education; and the Hamidiyé regiments will be transformed into reserve cavalry.

The Russo-Turkish agreement of February 8, 1914 marked the end of a prolonged involvement of the Powers with the Armenian Question, starting in 1878. During this period, in which the Armenians suffered greatly from the Turkish regime and even had been the victims of organized massacres, the European Powers were not capable of giving any effective support to the Armenians and on occasion their vain interventions had even provoked serious Turkish repercussions.

The present agreement made it possible, however, for this situation to be changed. In his evaluation of the negotiations on the Armenian

<sup>57</sup>O. Hoetzsch, ed., *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus* (cited hereafter as *I.B.Z.I.*), vol. 1 (Berlin, 1931), nr. 205/p. 190.

<sup>58</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15425/pp. 179-181; *British Documents*, nr. 591/pp. 545-546; *D.D.F.* 9, nr. 362/pp. 463-468. Though the agreement was signed on February 8, the main part of the final text was apparently already agreed upon before. The English ambassador Mallet had sent as early as January 28 that part (which with the exception of one sentence is the same as the final text) to Minister Grey (see *British Documents*, nr. 590/pp. 542-545). On February 8 some passages were added, in particular with regard to the question of parity of representation between Christians and Muslims in the general assemblies and administrative councils.

<sup>59</sup>*British Documents*, nr. 590/pp. 544-545; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 236-238.

reforms Gulkevich wrote to Sazonov that the note of February 8 was undoubtedly of tremendous importance for the future of the Armenian people, and he even called it the beginning of a new and happy time in the history of this people.<sup>60</sup>

With our present knowledge — that the near future would bring the total destruction of the Armenian people — it may seem extremely cynical to refer to a passage like this. In those days, however, the Armenians had every reason to set their hopes on the coming of the European inspectors-general.

#### THE CHOICE OF INSPECTORS-GENERAL

Von Mutius, the German chargé d'affaires in Constantinople (Wangenheim being on leave), wrote on February 9, 1914 to Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg that the Grand Vizir attached much value to the choice of inspectors-general. "He hopes," von Mutius said, "that capable men with strength of character will be proposed to him, who will lend themselves to no political intrigues."<sup>61</sup>

The search for eligible candidates had already begun, however, some time before. Right after the Wangenheim and de Giers agreement with the Grand Vizir, Minister Sazonov sent on December 31, 1913 a telegram to Iswolski, his ambassador in Paris, saying that in view of the fact that European inspectors-general would be appointed upon the recommendation of the Great Powers, it would be desirable to begin considering candidates from secondary Powers such as Denmark, Belgium or Holland. He would prefer that the candidates for both sectors would be of the same nationality and would also like to know if Boghos Nubar had candidates in mind.<sup>62</sup>

Concerning the candidates for the post of inspector-general one thing was absolutely clear from the beginning: a candidate from one of the Great Powers was acceptable neither to Turkey nor to the Great Powers, since for Turkey that would be too humiliating, while the Great Powers could not allow this important post to be occupied by one of their rivals. Therefore only a candidate from a minor and neutral country was eligible. The Armenian patriarch informed Sazonov on January 21, 1914 that he would prefer a candidate from Holland, Denmark, Norway or Sweden. In his opinion neither a Belgian nor a Swiss inspector-general would be appropriate, because of the important economic and commercial interests of those countries in Turkey, which might make inspectors from these countries sympathetic to the Turks.<sup>63</sup> Shortly afterward the patriarch received a letter from Boghos

<sup>60</sup>*I.B.Z.I.* 1, nr. 210/pp. 197, 199.

<sup>61</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15425/p. 180.

<sup>62</sup>*Iswolski* 3, nr. 1195/p. 439.

<sup>63</sup>*I.B.Z.I.* 1, nr. 71/p. 62.

Nubar saying that he had difficulties finding appropriate candidates, which made the first give to Nubar on February 3 the instruction to leave as soon as possible for The Hague in order to find candidates.<sup>64</sup> Boghos Nubar immediately took action, for on the same day he paid a visit to de Stuers, the Dutch envoy in Paris, asking if he could visit the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Loudon, on short notice in order to discuss possible Dutch candidates.<sup>65</sup>

The discussions about the candidates for inspector-general took place on three levels: through Boghos Nubar in cooperation with the Russian government and the Armenian patriarch, between the Powers, and through initiatives of the Grand Vizir. The position of the various Great Powers was as follows: England would prefer Dutch candidates, but was willing to leave the matter primarily in the hands of Germany and Russia;<sup>66</sup> Germany thought in the first instance a Dutchman or Swiss as the most appropriate;<sup>67</sup> France proposed two Norwegians: Hoff (secretary-general of the Norwegian Ministry of War) and Reimers (councillor at the Norwegian legation in Paris);<sup>68</sup> Russia preferred Belgian candidates and proposed the major-general Deguise and the former vice-governor of the Belgian Congo, Henry.<sup>69</sup>

Both Germany and Turkey were annoyed by the manner in which Russia proceeded with its candidates, partly because Boghos Nubar was involved. With regard to the latter it was reported that he wanted to have special influence through his son-in-law d'Aerschot, who was head of the Cabinet of the Belgian king.<sup>70</sup> The main reason for the Turkish opposition to a Belgian candidate was, however — according to the information given by Sazonov to the Dutch representative in Petersburg — that the Congo was colonized by Belgium and the Porte wanted to prevent Muslims from being placed on the same level as "negroes."<sup>71</sup>

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, nr. 177/p. 165.

<sup>65</sup>Telegram de Stuers to Loudon, 2/3/1914, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Den Haag [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague], Kabinet 1871-1919, Gezantschapsrapporten.

<sup>66</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15426/p. 182.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup>*I.B.Z.I.* 1, nr. 333/p. 336.

<sup>69</sup>*I.B.Z.I.* 2, nr. 2/p. 2.

<sup>70</sup>Van der Does de Willebois to Loudon, 3/26/1914, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

<sup>71</sup>Sweerts de Landas to Loudon, 3/28/1914, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. Van der Does de Willebois reported as well that the Grand Vizir Said Halim had informed him that he would for this reason by no means appoint "a Congo civil servant" (van der Does de Willebois to Loudon, 3/28/1914, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken).

The preference of Boghos Nubar for Belgian candidates, and the support he had from Russia, placed him in conflict with the Armenian patriarch who, for reasons other than those of the Porte, was against a Belgian inspector-general.

Though the Porte had to wait for the proposals of the Powers, the Grand Vizir undertook covert action. On March 3 he asked the Dutch representative in Constantinople, van der Does de Willebois, for a Dutch candidate, preferably among higher officials in the Dutch East Indies.<sup>72</sup> Having reported this request to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, van de Does de Willebois was informed by the latter that Boghos Nubar had already contacted him about the same affair. Indeed a strange coincidence, that the covert actions of Boghos Nubar and the Grand Vizir met in The Hague with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs!

On March 20 Minister Loudon wrote to van de Does de Willebois:

I have the honour to report to you that in the beginning of February Nubar Pascha has announced himself to me through the intervention of your colleague in Paris and has, introduced by the Russian representative here and by order of the Armenian Catholicos, asked the Dutch government to appoint candidates for the post of Inspector-General for the two sectors of East Anatolia. In connection with the representations made to you by the Grand-Vizier . . . you should communicate to Prince Said Halim that as candidates have been proposed: 1) L.C. Westenenk, Assistant-Resident in the Dutch East Indies, temporarily being in the country, 2) Major A.J. Doorman, Secretary General of the Department of War. This communication should not be given to the Grand-Vizier before you have consulted the Russian ambassador at your place about it.<sup>73</sup>

A few days later the Dutch minister sent a telegram to his representative in Constantinople saying that he could tell the Grand Vizir that Holland had appointed two candidates, but that the ambassadors should communicate their names. In the meantime, however, Swetchine, the Russian representative in The Hague, had already sent the names of the two Dutch candidates, Westenenk and Doorman, to Sazonov, who forwarded them in his turn to the Russian ambassadors at the Great Powers.<sup>74</sup>

With regard to the candidates, Germany made the concession to Russia to withdraw its Swiss candidate, while Russia allowed the addition of the Norwegian Hoff, in order to give the Porte a greater freedom of choice.<sup>75</sup> Eventually five candidates were presented by the Powers to the Porte: the Dutchmen Westenenk and Doorman, the Belgians

<sup>72</sup>Van der Does de Willebois to Loudon, 3/4/1914, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

<sup>73</sup>Loudon to van der Does de Willebois, 3/20/1914, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

<sup>74</sup>*I.B.Z.I.* 2, nr. 29/p. 21.

<sup>75</sup>*G.P.*, nr. 15434/p. 188.

Deguisse and Henry, and the Norwegian Hoff. On April 15, 1914 the Porte selected Westenenk and Hoff as inspectors-general of the six eastern vilayets.<sup>76</sup> ■

<sup>76</sup>*I.B.Z.I.* 2, nr. 227/p. 236.

# Diary Concerning the Armenian Mission\*

L.C. Westenenk<sup>1</sup>

**M**onday, 2 March 1914. Early in the morning I received a letter from the minister of foreign affairs, Jhr. Dr. J. Loudon,<sup>2</sup> informing me that he wished to speak with me as soon as possible about a matter that could be of great importance to me, and that he approached me on the advice of ex-minister Colijn.<sup>3</sup>

As I was unable to go the following day, I offered the minister my apologies by telephone and told him that I would not be able to meet him before Wednesday.

The minister agreed and informed me that the matter concerned a mission to Turkish-Armenia, and that I could be nominated "inspector-general" in that country to supervise the reforms to be introduced there at the insistence of the Great Powers. Turkish-Armenia was to be divided into two sectors, each under an inspector-general to be chosen from candidates proposed by some neutral countries; the an-

\*There is a more comprehensive hand-written manuscript of the diary and a typed version, which is an "abstract" (*uittreksel*) from the first. Both are in the archives of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkekunde [Royal Institute for Linguistics and Anthropology] in Leiden, The Netherlands. Besides the diaries, the archives also contain papers [letters, notes, reports] related to Westenenk's appointment as inspector-general. The diaries and papers have been presented to the Royal Institute for Linguistics and Anthropology by Mrs. J.E. Westenenk-Swart, daughter-in-law of L.C. Westenenk. Mrs. Westenenk has kindly given permission for the publication of the diaries. A translation has been made of the abstract from the diary. Passages from the hand-written version have been added, however, when they contain additional information. These are indicated with "Ms." (manuscript).

<sup>1</sup>Louis Constant Westenenk, born in 1872 in Penawangan [Java, Dutch East Indies], died 1930 in The Hague, The Netherlands. Westenenk had a career as a government official in the Dutch East Indies, appointed assistant resident in 1910. Married in 1897, he had four children (three daughters and a son). As of April 1913, he was on a ten month leave in The Netherlands. Westenenk has written two books: *Waar Mens en Tijger Buren Zijn* [*Where man and tiger are neighbors*] (1927) and *Het Rijk van Bittertong* [*The realm of Bittertongue*] (1932).

<sup>2</sup>J. Loudon (1866-1955). Diplomat; from 1913 to 1918, minister of foreign affairs.

<sup>3</sup>H. Colijn (1869-1944). From 1892 until 1907 a military career in the Dutch East Indies; from 1909 to 1911, member of Parliament; from 1911 to 1913, minister of war. From 1923 until the German invasion in 1940, he was minister in various Cabinets, lastly as prime minister.



nual salary would amount to some 70,000 francs, plus various immunities. The first sector would cover the vilajets of Trebizond, Sivas and Erzerum, and the other those of Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir and Kharput.

The minister would immediately send me the "note" containing the general principles regarding the reforms to be introduced.

*Tuesday, 3 March 1914.* The next day I received the "note." It contained the basis for the reforms and was drawn up by the ambassadors of the Great Powers at Constantinople together with the Turkish government; it was drafted on 8 February 1914.

*Wednesday, 4 March.* To The Hague. The minister now informed me that a certain Boghos Nubar Pasha, who had pleaded for the Armenian cause with various European governments, had approached H.E. with the request that the Netherlands should also propose two candidates for the above-mentioned post of inspector-general; for that purpose he had also gone to Brussels, where 10 candidates were already proposed.

Nubar Pasha, pursuing the views of the Russian government, acted as the representative of the catholicos at Tiflis (spiritual head of the Armenians), and of the patriarch, official head of the Armenians at Constantinople, and therefore as the representative of the Christian-Armenians. He did not come as the delegate of Turkey; the Turkish envoy at The Hague was accordingly provisionally kept out of the affair at that time. Russia, which had kept the lead with regard to the reforms, was preparing these at present.

The minister also said that the government would appreciate it if at least one Dutchman would be designated for this mission; further, that the inspectors-general would be appointed for a period of 10 years, but that H.E. had discussed with the minister of the colonies the possibility of perhaps not bringing my Indian career to a conclusion, and of arranging favorable conditions with regard to my time of service and pension, as had been done with Mr. Colijn when he was elected a member of the Second Chamber [member of Parliament].

H.E. was still in discussion regarding the proposal of a second Dutch candidate.

I asked H.E. to give me two days' time for my reply and returned to Deventer, but not before having expressed my thanks to ex-minister Colijn.

*Ms.: To The Hague.* Minister Loudon was very kindly disposed; as yet he only knew that the stipend would amount to around 70,000 fr. together with various immunities, equipment, a palace, traveling expenses, etc. This was a verbal elucidation by Nubar Pasha (who had visited the Netherlands and Belgium requesting the proposal of two candidates by each country) of the "note" which the minister had sent



*Photo taken by the son of Westenenk on August 14, 1914 while waiting for the arrival of the sultan at the mosque. In the foreground (with fez) is Westenenk and standing in the background are Jemal Pasha and Enver Pasha. The picture is owned by Mrs. van Delden-Westenenk and is reproduced with her permission.*

me on Tuesday morning. I asked for time for reflection and returned to Deventer. We decided to say yes.

*Thursday, 5 March.* I wrote the letter and sent it the next morning, after having — Friday, 6th March — slept over it again. Considerations turning the scale: that we would only be around 6 days' distance from the children; the new and challenging field of activity; and the financial side of the matter.

*Friday, 6 March.* In the morning I sent a letter to the minister, asking H.E. to put me on the list of candidates.

*Wednesday, 11 March.* Five days later I was called to attend a meeting at Minister Loudon's office with the Russian envoy to The Hague, Mr. Swetchine. The latter gave the information that the stipend of the inspectors-general had been fixed at £400 per month, and that in addition "*des autos, un palais, des frais d'installation et de voyage . . .*" [cars, a palace, cost of installations and of traveling . . .] would be placed at their disposal . . . I also learned that Nubar Pasha had considered the speedy nominations by Belgium as job-hunting, and that he had personally deleted eight candidates, leaving only two: De Guise, the ex-vice-governor of the Congo and a Belgian general.

Now came a time of waiting. As a second Dutch candidate, Major Doorman, secretary-general of the ministry of war, had been proposed.

*Ms.:* Meeting at The Hague at Minister Loudon's office with the Russian envoy . . . Minister Loudon and ex-Minister Colijn, with whom I had also consulted on 4 March, had assured me that my Indian career would not be brought to a conclusion and that my years of service in Armenia would count towards the Indian pension — the same had been agreed upon also for Colijn when he went as a military man into civil service and became a member of the Second Chamber. On 4 March I also learned that the government had at first approached former Governor General J.B. van Heutsz<sup>4</sup> and former Minister of War and the Navy, H. Colijn, but that the first considered himself too old and the second had in prospect an appointment as director of the Dordtsch Petroleum Company. Thereupon the latter had mentioned me. The list for second candidates for Holland consisted of Colonel van Rietschoten, whose wife preferred to continue living in the Indies; former resident de Bruyn Kops; Colonel Burton; and assistant resident Hellwig, all of whom were deleted; I do not know why. Finally, a second candidate for Holland, secretary-general of the ministry of war, Major Doorman, was nominated.

*Tuesday, 7 April.* First tidings in the newspapers about the judging of the list of candidates at Constantinople.

<sup>4</sup>J.B. van Heutsz (1851-1924). After a military career from 1904 to 1909, he was appointed governor-general of the Dutch East Indies.

*Ms.*: First tidings in the papers that the council of ministers at Constantinople was "weighing" some candidates — no names were mentioned. A few days later it was announced that a Norwegian, Major Hoff, had been nominated as a candidate as well.

*Thursday, 9 April.* As candidate for Norway, Major Hoff (secretary-general of war) was suddenly mentioned.

*Friday, 10 April.* The *Times* reported that the Belgian De Guise and the Norwegian Hoff were appointed inspectors-general. The nomination of a Dutchman did not seem to have success.

*Ms.*: 12 and 13 April. Easter days — all hope almost melted into air.

14 April. Medical examination at The Hague — got 6 months' extension. I visited Colijn at the same time; officially nothing was known yet, but . . . yes, all papers had reported it. Colijn thought that the Belgian had been appointed as he was married to the daughter of the head of the Cabinet of the king of Belgium (this was not correct: it was the daughter of Nubar Pasha who was married to the head of the Cabinet, and since the Young Turks considered Nubar Pasha to be a great intriguer, they did not want the Belgians).

*Wednesday, 15 April.* In the afternoon I received from the Turkish envoy at The Hague the following telegram:

*Le ministre de Turquie vous prie de lui faire savoir d'urgence quel jour et à quelle heure de l'après midi vous pourriez venir le voir à 81a Bezuidenhout; il aurait une communication importante à vous faire.*

(Signée:) Aristarchy

[The minister of Turkey calls upon you to let him know with urgency on what day and at which time in the afternoon you would be able to see him at 81a Bezuidenhout; there would be an important communication to be made to you.

(Signed:) Aristarchy]

Had I been appointed? I telegraphed back: "*Je me présenterai vendredi à 2 heures*" [I will present myself on Friday at 2 o'clock].

*Ms.*: Telephoned to The Hague, Colijn. He told me that Aristarchy is the name of the Turkish minister, minister plenipotentiary at The Hague . . . In the meantime the papers had mentioned the reports on the revolt of the Kurds in the southern part of Turkish-Armenia, Bitlis, etc. That was still more irritating; would I be appointed after all?

*Thursday 16 April.* All morning papers reported the appointment of Hoff and of myself; congratulations came from all sides; no communication, however, from the ministry of foreign affairs.

*Friday, 17 April.* To The Hague. At the ministry nothing was known. The Turkish government had now taken the affair in its own hands and communicated only with its envoy at The Hague.

Donders: 16 April	<p>Telegram van Dyck (mortu) met datum van 18.4.5 v.m.</p> <p><u>Halde van inspectie gevoerd!</u></p> <p>Ik heb schijf van 2. station <sup>stads: Alkmaar, Amst., Dyck, Haren (vondst.)</sup> - en 2. station, - en 2. station - en 2. station</p> <p>Algemeen (kader) blad, ook in de Ministerie Orde - telegram van Renter veldende de kennis van mij en den Voor Hoff.</p> <p>In de spijzig kwam telegrafische en telegrafische vragen - schiedende, van uit van mij. Renter.</p>
Vrijdag 17 April	<p>Nieuw den Haag. Schiedende veldende. [Mr. S. Haren van v.m. - Mr. H. T. Donders van Treuting, schiedende - Renter, schiedende]</p> <p>Nieuw Terschuur van Renter veldende. Ik heb den den Haren</p> <p>Artenveld in 2. schiedende veldende, veldende, - en veldende</p> <p>schiedende (Terschuur veldende?) H. veldende in de schiedende veldende veldende</p> <p>had in telegraf. veldende <sup>van mij</sup> veldende veldende veldende veldende</p> <p>van den den Renter - had ik den spijzig veldende te Renter: veldende veldende</p> <p>veldende veldende veldende veldende: veldende veldende veldende? Ik</p> <p>veldende veldende veldende veldende. Bij den den veldende</p> <p>schiedende Mr. Donders en Haren veldende veldende telegram veldende veldende</p> <p>veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende</p> <p>veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende</p>
Zaterdag 18 April	<p>In de veldende veldende veldende, veldende veldende veldende veldende</p>
Zondag 19	<p>influenza 28.2; - Ont. Holl. - veldende veldende te veldende: 4-1.</p>
Maandag 20	<p>Telegram - Terschuur veldende: veldende veldende? veldende: veldende</p> <p>veldende veldende, veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende</p> <p>Brief van veldende veldende in den Haag te veldende veldende: Haag 18 April</p> <p>D. Haren veldende, veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende</p> <p>te Renter: veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende</p> <p>veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende veldende</p>

Excerpt from the original diary of L.C. Westenenk.

Donderdag 16 April

Alle morgenbladen vermeldden de benoeming van Hoff en uit alle kanten kwamen gelukwensen; geen bericht echter van het departement van Buitenlandsche Zaken.

Vrijdag 17 April

Naar den Haag. Aan het Ministerie was niets bekend. De Turksche Regeering had nu de zaak in handen genomen en waarschuwde slechts haren gezant in den Haag.

De Turksche gezant zeide mij dat hij een telegram van den Groot Vizier had ontvangen met verzoek mij mede te deelen, dat ik door de Porte was benoemd en dat ik zoo spoedig mogelijk te Constantinopel werd verwacht "pour signer le contrat de service" (krachtsuitdrukking) zie 27 April en 3 Mei)

"Ik weet niets omtrent de geheele zaak," zeide Aristarch Bey, "zegt U mij maar wat ik terug moet seinen."

(Inderdaad was de Turksche gezant door zijne regeering geheel buiten de zaak gehouden, ook omdat en dit teekent de Oostersche politiek—hij een groot vijand was van den Groot Vizier; hij was bovendien van Grieksche

Typewritten version of the diary, prepared by L.C. Westenank.

The Turkish envoy told me that he had received a telegram from the Grand Vizir with the request to inform me that I had been appointed by the Porte and that I was expected as soon as possible in Constantinople *pour signer le contrat de service* [in order to sign the contract of service] — (strong phrase; see 27 April and 3 May).

"I do not know anything about the whole affair," Aristarchy Bey said. "You just tell me what I have to telegraph back." (Indeed, the Turkish envoy was completely kept out of the affair by his government, the reason being — and this is characteristic in the affairs of Eastern countries — that he was a great enemy of the Grand Vizir; in addition he was of Greek origin.)

After consultation with the secretary-general, Mr. S. Hannema, I asked the Turkish minister to telegraph the following to the Grand Vizir:

*Monsieur Westenenk est disposé à partir à Constantinople vendredi prochain pour retourner après en Hollande pour règlement d'affaires. Je vous prie de mettre à ma disposition les fonds nécessaires pour ce voyage de service de l'Inspecteur Général.* [Mr. Westenenk is ready to leave for Constantinople next Friday and will return afterwards to Holland in order to arrange his affairs. I request you to place at my disposal the necessary funds for this tour of duty of the inspector-general.]

That day I returned to Deventer.

*Monday, 20 April.* Received a telegram from the Turkish envoy asking me how much the traveling expenses would be and sent the answer: "*Reiskosten, retour, 800 francs; j'ignore les frais de mon séjour à Constantinople*" [Traveling expenses, return, 800 francs; I do not know the expenses of my stay at Constantinople].

The same day I received a letter from Minister Loudon asking me to come to The Hague in order to meet there with Mr. Zavriev,<sup>5</sup> representative of the Armenian patriarch, who would like to see me — the

<sup>5</sup>Hakob Zavriev, Russian Armenian of the Dashnak party. See Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia. The Survival of a Nation* (London, 1980), p. 427. For Zavriev's earlier contacts with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see *I.B.Z.I.* 1, nr. 147/p. 133 and A. Mandelstam, *Le sort de l'Empire Ottoman* (Lausanne/Paris, 1917), p. 209. On March 24, 1914 the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Sazonov, informed the embassies of Paris, Brussels and The Hague that the Armenian patriarch in Constantinople had "instructed an Armenian politician, the Russian subject dr. Zavriev, to enter into negotiations with the appointed candidates for the posts of Inspector-General." Sazonov asked "to assure Zavriev, who was known to the Ministry, all possible support in the execution of the mission." Swetchine, the Russian envoy in The Hague, reported on May 6 that "as dr. Zavriev declared, he had succeeded in convincing Mr. Westenenk" that too large a subservience toward the Porte would enlarge his difficulties. These could only be overcome through pressure on the Porte "from the side of the foreign embassies in Constantinople, in particular of the Russian one" (*I.B.Z.I.* 2, nr. 319/p. 310). That this assessment of Westenenk's attitude proved not to be correct may be seen, for instance, from his statement at the end of May 4 in the manuscript of his diary and from his discussions with Swetchine on June 18. In some separate comments Westenenk even remarks: "To ask openly the support of Russia or to be tied too much to Russia was highly undesirable and naturally not at all in line with the other Great Powers" (Westenenk papers).



Turkish envoy should not be aware of this. H.E. further wrote that the Russian envoy would not believe at all that I had to leave for Constantinople at such an early date.

*Tuesday, 21 April.* To The Hague. I had lunch in hotel *de Twee Steden* [the Two Cities] as guest of the Armenian Dr. Zavriev and the mining engineer Pastermajian,<sup>6</sup> former deputy of Erzerum and one of the leaders of the revolutionary party Dashnaktsutjun [Armenian Revolutionary Federation].

The most interesting conversation with these civilized and intelligent men, who would do anything for the "cause," was mainly concerned with the subjects also dealt with in Marcel Léart's *La question arménienne à la lumière des documents*, a booklet which they offered me together with various important documents dealing with the sufferings of the Armenians and their striving for reforms.

With regard to the appointment of the inspectors-general and the pressure of Germany, they told me the following: The Germans have always followed a policy to the detriment of the Armenians. They are afraid that the Russians will obtain too much of a foothold in Asia Minor: therefore Germany does not want to sanction the reforms, which are so much desired by Armenia and advocated by Russia in order to have peaceful borders (Armenian-Turkish); it was feared that Russia would get too much influence through this: Armenia should not be allowed a revival, nor railways; only the Bagdad track was allowed to prosper. There were dreams of a German Asia Minor, similar to the British hold on Egypt.

When the reforms were discussed in 1913, as a restoration of the implementation of article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1885 [sic!],<sup>7</sup> the Dreibund had accordingly declared itself against it.

Finally, however, Germany had yielded to the pressure from Russia and of the Armenians; who pleaded for the reforms with all the Great Powers. But their demand for one province under a European governor-general had been refused. It was accepted that Turkish-Armenia would be divided into two sectors (indicated under 2 March). Not one governor-general, but two European inspectors-general; not one administrative council, but one in every *vilayet* (Turkish province, governed by a *vali*, "governor-general"). One European governor-general could give too much autonomy to the country and that would be too offensive to the Turks . . . In reality one was reluctant to put into one hand the possibility of an increase of Russian influence. Germany also managed to obtain an agreement that the inspectors-general do not govern, but control. Germany further supported Turkey in ob-

<sup>6</sup>Garegin Pasdermajian (1873-1924), better known as Armen Garo. See Walker, *Armenia*, p. 382.

<sup>7</sup>Sic. Should be 1878.

taining a provision that Christians could only be called to offices *selon la loi* [according to the law]; that is to say, when they fulfill various requirements by the Turks with regard to education, examinations, etc. But since the Armenians were only admitted in small numbers to the training colleges and to sitting for necessary examinations, the Turks completely succeeded in keeping the number of Christian officials extremely low. The Turks dared to require this, while in the southern part there were various Kurdish chiefs, who could not read or write, etc.

The Armenians urgently requested me to postpone my departure on Friday, which had been telegraphed to the Porte: in the first place, such a hurry was not necessary at all (compare 20 April, last sentence). They did not understand why this hurry was made by the Turkish government, when the Armenians had been waiting since 1885.<sup>8</sup> It would be a good thing to show the Turkish government that the position of the inspector-general was such that the Turkish government need not act in such a commanding way. The Russian envoy as well was of the opinion that such a hurry was not necessary. With regard to the disposition of the Armenians towards Russia, they declared that, as a matter of course, the Armenians expected most from the Russians. They did not desire to fall under Russian influence; they had already fought and suffered too long because of their religion and their nationality. But since the reforms, especially the preparations for them, were directed by Russia, Russia certainly had to be taken into account.

In the second place, they urged me to postpone my departure and to make the journey through Paris, since Hoff would be there next Monday. They would be there too, and we could then discuss many other problems together, and I could travel to Constantinople in the company of Hoff.

I realized the great advantages of getting acquainted with Hoff, as soon and as well as possible, and therefore agreed.

Now I went to the Turkish envoy in order to inform him that, in the interest of the cause, I wanted to meet Hoff in Paris and tried to contact him by telegram to let him know, and that therefore I could not leave on Friday for Constantinople; I asked the minister to telegraph this information [to the Turkish government]. He informed me that the Porte had placed 1000 frs. at my disposal for my journey both ways. I returned to Deventer.

Ms.: To The Hague, at 11:30 a.m. to Minister Loudon, who said that Mr. Zavriev, representative of the patriarch, and Pastermajian, former deputy of Erzerum, had arrived from Constantinople in order to see me. Telephoned the Russian envoy; he answered that the gentlemen were staying at the Two Cities, upon which I proposed to go there,

<sup>8</sup>See note 7.

since I wanted to speak to them in private. Mr. Zavriev promptly asked me for lunch which I accepted. I left the minister and went to the Armenians . . .

*Vóór 1877 l'Erménistan, composée des districts de Tchelder, Kars, Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Mouche, Hekkiari. Après la guerre Russo-Turque en 1878 on a formé les vilayets de: Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharpout, Sivas, et on a opéré de telle sorte que la majorité fût partout assurée aux musulmans. Les arméniens trouvent donc de toute nécessité que ce sectionnement administratif arbitraire soit révisé(?). Le G.G. (après: les inspecteurs généraux) doit être une personnalité vraiment libérée de tous préjugés et possédant l'expérience, l'esprit d'organisation et toutes les qualités nécessaires pour les délicates fonctions du g. g. S'il était arménien il provoquerait le mécontentement des musulmans etc. Il faudra choisir un gouverneur étranger si l'on veut qu'il trouve crédit auprès de ses administrés. Il faut être placé au dessus de tous les conflits ethniques et religieux, fort de sa situation indépendante et pourra gagner la confiance de tous et servir les intérêts généraux du pays, sans distinction de race ni de religion. Il faut qu'il soit protégé dans l'exécution de ses fonctions.*

[Before 1877 Armenia was composed of the districts of Tchelder, Kars, Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Mouche, Hekkiari. After the Russo-Turkish war of 1878 the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharpout, Sivas, have been established and one has operated in such a way that the majority was guaranteed everywhere for the Muslims. The Armenians therefore consider it necessary that this division into administrative sections will be revised (?). The governor-general (afterward: the inspector-general) should be a personality really free of all prejudices and having the experience, organizing spirit and all the necessary qualities for the delicate official duties of the governor-general. He should be beyond all ethnic and religious conflicts, relying on his independent position and he will be able to gain the confidence of all and serve the general interest of the country, without distinction of race or religion. He should be protected in the execution of his official duties.]<sup>9</sup>

*Friday, 24 April. Visit of the Armenian gentleman.*

At the table, Pastermajian told me that he was one of the Armenians who had committed the extremely daring bomb outrage on the Ottoman Bank at Constantinople, and that the horrible outcome of it had only been the massacre of thousands of Armenians in the capital, under the eyes of the ambassadors of the Great Powers, while the promise had been made that nobody's hair would be touched (comp. under 16 July the statement of one of the officials of that banking institution, himself an Armenian).

<sup>9</sup>This is apparently a verbatim report of part of the information given by Zavriev and Pastermajian.

Ms.: Visit of the Armenians . . . Matters further discussed, among others received from them a first draft of the instruction to the inspector-general by the patriarch (secret).<sup>10</sup>

*Saturday, 25 April.* I sent the following telegram to the Turkish envoy: "*Monsieur le Ministre de Turquie, Notre Ministre des Affaires Etrangères m'a fait part que Monsieur Hoff sera lundi à Paris et nous nous rencontrerons là. En conséquence de notre entretien je vous communique que je pars lundi pour Paris et que je vous télégraphierai de là le jour de mon départ pour Constantinople*" [Mr. Envoy of Turkey, our minister of foreign affairs has informed me that Mr. Hoff will be in Paris on Monday and that we will meet each other there. Because of our meeting I inform you that I leave for Paris on Monday and that I will telegraph you the day of my departure for Constantinople].

In the evening I received through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a copy of *Revue de Paris*, which contained the important article "*La question kurde-arménienne*" (not to the taste of the Armenians, since the dealing in arms by the leaders of the Dashnaksutiun is discussed as an incontestable truth), which had been sent by our envoy in Paris, Ridder de Stuers.

*Monday 27 April.* While my wife and I were preparing for our departure for Paris I received the following letter from the Turkish envoy:

*La Haye, le 26 avril 1914*

Monsieur,

*J'avais prévenu le Grand Vézir de votre intention de vous rencontrer avec le Colonel Hoff à Paris. Son Altesse me télégraphie de vous inviter à aller directement à Constantinople, le Colonel Hoff devant également s'y rendre, vous pourriez de cette façon vous y entretenir. Agréez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération la plus distinguée,*

*le Ministre de Turquie  
(signée:) Aristarchy*

*P.S. Je vous écris par la poste par ce que la télégraphe de Deventer ne fonctionne pas me dit-on le dimanche.*

[I had informed the Grand Vizir of your intention to meet Colonel Hoff in Paris. His Highness telegraphs me to ask you to go directly to Constantinople; since Colonel Hoff has to go there as well, you will be able to see him there. Accept, Sir, the assurance of my very distinguished respect,  
the envoy of Turkey  
(signed:) Aristarchy]

*P.S. I write you by post since I am told that the telegraph of Deventer does not work on Sunday.]*

This made clear the evident intention to keep Hoff and me separated for the time being.

<sup>10</sup>"*Avant projet d'instructions pour les Inspecteurs Généraux préparé par le Patriarcat arménien*" [Preliminary draft of instructions for the Inspectors-General by the Armenian Patriarchate] dated February 23, 1914, consisting of 35 points (Westenenk papers).

Of course, the arranged plan was not changed: we left for Paris, arrived there early in the morning and moved into the Grand Hotel.

*Tuesday, 28 April.* From Amsterdam I had asked for an appointment at 9 o'clock with our envoy, Mr. A.E.L. Ridder de Stuers, 57 Avenue Kléber, and had announced to Hoff, at the address of the Norwegian envoy, my arrival. Our envoy, to whom I showed the letter from Aristarchy, was of the opinion that I had been in the right not to change my itinerary. He informed me that the Russian ambassador Iswolsky had been disposed very unpleasantly since a Dutchman had been appointed and not a Belgian; he had strongly supported the candidate from Brussels, but France did not want Belgians. Bitter controversy had taken place between Iswolsky and the French government, whom he blamed for a lack of cooperation. The French government, however, stuck to their preference for the Dutchman. The affair was put before the tsar, but the latter agreed with France; in order to show, however, how the French government appreciates her ambassador in Paris, he was decorated by the tsar . . .

Our envoy had further learned that England had not participated when Russia and France did not agree.

At ten o'clock I went to the Norwegian envoy. I did not find him, but learned that Hoff stayed at the Hotel Carillon, and I visited him there.

Nicolai Hoff, who had just been appointed lieutenant-colonel and had been active during the last 17 years as secretary-general of war at Christiania, 45 years old, appeared to have been invited by telephone to be nominated for inspector-general, when staying with his father at Bergen. In consequence of the conversation by telephone he had tendered his resignation as officer and had immediately left for France in order to brush up his French. So he was not able to provide further information; he even did not know how much the stipend did in fact amount to, so that I informed him of everything that had happened.

*Ms.:* . . . He [the Dutch minister in Paris, Ridder de Stuers] told me that the Russian ambassador in Paris had been greatly offended that a Dutchman had been appointed and not a Belgian. Bitter strife between him and the French government about this, blaming the latter as not attaching value to the Triple Entente, for the French government had supported the Dutch candidate. It went so far that the tsar decorated him in order to show how this ambassador was appreciated . . .

The meeting [with Hoff] was soon the most noteworthy moment during this busy time. Hoff was about 5 cm shorter than me, thin, bony head, kind face, sharp features, small eyes. A cheerful appearance; somewhat nervous. Cordial meeting and pleasant conversation in his bedroom. It became evident soon that we had completely the same ideas with regard to concepts of mentality. The appointment was made that he would come tomorrow at 9 o'clock where we would meet the Armenians, who were now in Paris.

*Wednesday, 29 April.* At ten o'clock, the conference with Hoff and the Armenians.<sup>11</sup> During this it appeared of particular urgency to point out to the Russian ambassador an article in the *Nieuwe Rotterdammer Courant* of 24 to 25 April, sent to me by cavalry captain Gelderman, entitled "The Reforms in Armenia." In it was reported by a correspondent in Constantinople (most probably de Kruyff, honored by the pope with the title of baron and a most pro-German journalist, having become well-known because of his publications about the Dutch mission in Albania) that the Turkish minister of interior, Talaat Bey, had offered to the head of the gendarmerie, the Frenchman Bauman Pasha, 1,670,000 Prs. (f 167,000) in order to reform the gendarmerie and that Talaat is then said to have told the ambassadors: "We are doing all this in order to show how we want to improve the situation ourselves . . . . Let the two inspectors-general stay in Constantinople for the time being in order to prepare everything properly" . . . and the ambassadors are said to have agreed with that. However incredible this sounded, the Armenians declared that the Turkish government would do its utmost to keep the reforms a dead letter.

At twelve o'clock the secretary to the embassy, Jhr. de Beaufort, brought me several secret reports by French consular officials, which had been typed out at the ministry of foreign affairs,<sup>12</sup> and two very secret documents, which had been handed over in original in order to take cognizance of them.

At twelve-thirty I had lunch with Hoff at the residence of the Norwegian envoy Baron van Wedel Jorlsbert and met there, to my sur-

<sup>11</sup>On April 29, 1914 Iswolski reported the following to the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Sazonov: "Tomorrow the Dutchman Westenenk and the Norwegian Hoff, who have been appointed Inspectors for Armenia, will leave from here for Constantinople. From discussions of these two persons with me and dr. Zavriev it appeared that they hardly understand in an entire proper way their coming role as organs of the European control and the necessity to rely primarily on Russia. It is very much desirable that they will get advice and instructions from you as soon as they arrive in Constantinople. Dr. Zavriev travels as well to Constantinople and will fully inform you about the characteristic features of both and his experiences with them" (*I.B.Z.I.* 2, nr. 319/pp. 310-311). On May 7, 1914 the Russian ambassador in Berlin reported about a visit paid to him by Zavriev. The latter had told him that on closer acquaintance he had changed a little his opinion on Westenenk and Hoff: "On the basis of the first discussions, which he [Zavriev] had had with the future Inspectors," the ambassador says, "he was almost convinced that they would consider themselves as Turkish officials; at present, however, he comes to the conclusion after more discussions with them, that they are beginning to understand their role, which they are called upon to play and that they will meet the importance of their duty, especially when one continues to influence them in the desirable manner, primarily though, when they will get proper instructions" (*I.B.Z.I.* 2, nr. 376/p. 369). On July 9 the Russian ambassador in Constantinople wrote to Sazonov: "Westenenk, who arrived later [than Hoff] only yesterday started negotiations with Talaat. I will express myself about him only after the negotiations have been finished. He has promised to confer with me about everything. Unfortunately, however, his main concern is his material security" (*I.B.Z.I.* 4, nr. 149/p. 147).

<sup>12</sup>These are reports by the French vice-consulates at Mersine and Adana, Van, Diarbekir, Aleppo, Mossul, Erzerum and Sivas (Westenenk papers).

prise, the Dutch envoy. At the table I discussed the article from the *Nieuwe Rotterdammer Courant* and it was decided to go together to the minister of foreign affairs, president of the council, Paul Doumergue, who had just given a reception in the afternoon.

Mr. Doumergue greeted Hoff and me with glowing words and promised every support from France. And when, after all, the question of the gendarmerie came up for discussion and the Norwegian envoy pointed out how it was of the greatest importance for us to have one or more officers of our own nationality at our disposal, the minister promised to write to the French ambassador in Constantinople in this spirit.

After the reception, the Norwegian envoy pointed out that it was of great practical use to talk with the *directeur de la division politique et commerciale au ministère des affaires étrangères* [director of the political and commercial division of the ministry of foreign affairs], Mr. de Margerie, minister plenipotentiary, about the affairs. Seeing him caused the Norwegian envoy a great deal of trouble, but he succeeded with the help of Mr. Fouquières, *directeur adjoint du protocole* (deputy director of the protocol).

Mr. de Margerie also promised all possible assistance, declared not to know anything about the facts reported in the *Nieuw Rotterdammer Courant* and had serious doubts about them. With regard to the gendarmerie, since Macedonia French officers had been sent out for the Turkish gendarmeire, he did not object to an aide-de-camp of our own nationality.

In the company of our envoy I visited the Turkish ambassador and then the German and the Russian ambassadors. We only found the latter, who had been warned by Mr. de Stuers, at home. Mr. Iswolsky smiled at the reports in the *Nieuwe Rotterdammer Courant*. "Where would the Turks get the money from?" He promised every support and explained again that it was the sole object of Russia to have tranquility and peace in Armenia and that neutral inspectors had especially been appointed *qui ne font pas de la politique* (who are not involved in politics) in order to avoid political fanaticism.

Ms.: . . . In view of the *Nieuw Rotterdammer Courant* I asked de Beaufort to prepare the ambassador for my coming. I understood that I could not see the Russian ambassador without having been to the Turkish ambassador — but also Germany? . . . At 2:30 p.m. we went to the minister, were the first, were received. . . . Fervor of puffed-up sentences on Armenia as if he just threw them off, good task, eye of Europe, much honor, etc. — France wants the best, etc., very nice — I was burning to point out that we could not do anything without the assistance of the Powers; I wanted to tell about the reports in the *Nieuwe Rotterdammer Courant* and of the necessity of our being the absolute masters of the gendarmerie and of having the power to ap-

point the officers. Fortunately, van Wedel began very energetically, as he is . . . about that gendarmerie — I looked at him again earnestly — he kept pressing, until he had forced the minister to say that he would write to the ambassador in Constantinople that he considered it necessary that we have some officers of our own nationality around us, who could be reliable. When we got up and outside, I thanked the Norwegian envoy cordially. He had taken a fancy to it. Now the head of the Cabinet is Mr. de Margerie, he said. He is *ministre plénipotentiaire, directeur de la division politique et commerciale au ministère des affaires étrangères* [director of the political and commercial department of the ministry of foreign affairs], and the soul of the ministry . . . since that minister does not know anything about it . . . Again about everything, and again van Wedel began about gendarmerie. O yes, an aide-de-camp would be possible for the inspector-general, but it had always been our aim to send officers for the gendarmerie — that has started with Macedonia. Now we have Bouman, and there are also others? Yes, I said, an English colonel in Erzerum. Well, he apparently considered it preferable to keep Frenchmen in general, but these are all affairs for the ambassadors. Now van Wedel told what the minister had promised. After this, conversation about the necessary assistance from the side of the ambassadors, etc., etc. Everything was discussed; he now knew what we expected from the support of the Great Powers . . .

*Thursday, 30 April.* The next day we had a most interesting meeting with Hoff, Zavriev, Pastermajian and with a representative both of the catholicos and of the patriarch, who had come from London especially for this meeting.

Left at 7:13 with the Orient Express.

*Sunday, 3 May.* Arrived in Constantinople.

Essad Bey, second secretary of foreign affairs, welcomed us at the station on behalf of the Grand Vizir and took us in the car of the Grand Vizir (also minister of foreign affairs) to Hotel Pera Palace.

In the afternoon a letter arrived from the Sublime Porte announcing that the Grand Vizir would receive Hoff and me the next day, Monday, at twelve o'clock.

In the afternoon we paid a visit to the Dutch envoy, Jhr. Mr. van der Does de Willebois. Our envoy, to whom I told everything, took a gloomy view of the future of the mission, given the difficult position of the inspector-general and the mentality of the Turks. I declared therefore to be firmly determined not to sign the contract under all circumstances and to refuse to take up my duties unless I was granted sufficient power to be able to govern the country.

The envoy also informed us that the Grand Vizir had requested all ambassadors in Constantinople not to take official notice of us, nor to interfere with our affairs; the envoy therefore had not been able, from



his side, to welcome me at the station; he was also not allowed to introduce me at the Porte. All negotiations would always have to be conducted by us alone, without actual advice from representatives or dragomen.

The envoy explained to us this attitude of the Turkish government by informing us how the Turkish internal policy is always aimed at keeping secret for their own nation the fact that any measure is the result of pressure from the Great Powers or one of them. The appearance must be kept at any price; the *sauver les apparences* [save the face] helps to keep up their own authority with the people, and this system is even applied in the population against each other, and is, indeed, an ordinary phenomenon with an Eastern people (comp. 17 and 27 April).

(The Indonesian *asal-djangan-maloe-kita* system; i.e., "only if we are not put to shame".)

*Monday, 4 May.* When in the morning the Russian attaché Boris Jakouscheff paid us a visit it soon became evident how great the interest of the Russian ambassador was. Hoff talked to him in private and promised that we would come in the afternoon. After this, however, the Russian dragoman, Serge Toukholka, came to tell us that the next day would be more suitable for the Russian ambassador; this was fortunate for we did not know yet how long the conversation with the Grand Vizir would take and what its nature would be.

At twelve o'clock at the Porte. To the word of welcome of the Grand Vizir I answered that we were honored by the appointment, that our only aim was to help bring about the progress of the country and people of Armenia, to make the country more valuable, the population more satisfied; that we were most anxious to see the contract and the instructions, that the matter of prime importance was the granting to us of sufficient power by the Turkish government. I also added to this that I had not yet broken off my career in the Dutch East Indies, and had not yet asked permission from H.M. the Queen to enter into foreign public service.

After this the Grand Vizir promised that we would receive as soon as possible both the contract and the instructions.

Further on in the conversation I said that I had already consulted various sources, to which the Grand Vizir answered that it was preferable that I would see the situation for myself, since the authors of those books had their *parti pris* [were prejudiced] — my views acquired through these sources would indeed soon be changed.

At the departure I informed the Grand Vizir that "*j'irai rendre aux ambassadeurs une visite de politesse parce qu'ils m'ont mis sur la liste des candidats*" [I would pay a courtesy visit to the ambassadors, since they had put me on the list of candidates].

"That is not necessary in a hurry," the Grand Vizir said . . .

"... I would now like to see the minister of interior."

"All right," His Excellency answered.

The minister of interior, Talaat Bey, could only receive us at two o'clock.

Talaat Bey greeted us very cordially, and assured us that he would assist us as much as possible, that we would always cooperate. When I answered that we from our side would do all our best for this mission, but that we would appreciate, therefore, to know the contract and the instructions soon, H.E. said that he himself would pay us a visit in the afternoon and would bring along the contract for discussion.

I requested, however, to study it at ease.

"All right," the minister said, "then my secretary will bring it to you tomorrow to the hotel."

Talaat Bey also told us: "We have several Europeans in our service; they rendered us many services and we are most grateful for them, so we also hope for your success!" (So in a charming way the statement meant: take heed, you are for us just officials as those others.)

At six o'clock to our envoy came, in order to discuss everything. The latter was very curious if we would receive the next day the contract and instructions.

Ms.: ... I also wanted to see the minister of interior; oh, very good. But he could only see us at 2 o'clock. Big, about 38 years old, pleasant, jovial, charming. First the usual talk, but differently: "*nous travaillerons ensemble*" [we will work together] "and I hope that we will have success, we will assist you as much as possible" ... I answered that I liked so much what he had said to us, that he could depend on us, etc., etc., and that our work would be in the interest of *his* government. His secretary was also present — bad face; hope that he does not have much influence. So we will wait until tomorrow.

Having returned to the hotel, Serge Toukholka (see above) came: had we traveled with Zavriev? This was reported in the papers! No! Had I talked with him then? Surely. And has he given you all kinds of information? (I felt, of course, that this referred to information regarding Russia.) Well, sir, I have studied all kinds of sources with regard to the Armenian question, and there are so many points of view, Armenian, Kurdish, Turkish; isn't that so? We will be *for* everyone and *against* no one, and only on the spot itself will we be able to judge correctly about everything. Fortunately, he left off there! When we could visit the ambassadors was not to be estimated at the moment — very occupied — but we would certainly do it. We must hope for support and assistance: in the first place from the Turkish government and also from the Great Powers ...

*Tuesday, 5 May.* The draft contract did not arrive, but the second secretary of Talaat Bey and his head of the cabinet, Hasan Fehmy Bey,

did come, in order to tell us that everything was in process and that Count Ostrorog would treat these affairs with us.

At 2:30 we paid a visit to Ostrorog. This high official, Polish by origin, had already been mentioned to me by the Armenians in Holland as being a great enemy of the Armenians, *plus turc que les Turcs* [more Turkish than the Turks]. After all sorts of casual talk at last it was the turn of the draft contract, and he read it out.

I replied to this directly, saying that, though I did not consider at all the financial aspect of the matter to be the most important one, I still had to point out that there was a large difference between the sum of 250 Lt. plus 100 Lt. traveling expenses per month, as mentioned in the contract, and the stipend of 400 Lt. plus "*un palais, des autos, des frais d'installation, et de voyage . . .*" as offered to me on 11 March. (Compare with this the draft contract of the Turkish government, appendix A.)<sup>13</sup>

Ostrorog was beside himself for a moment. "Impossible," Ostrorog said, "I am absolutely sure that a cabinet council has fixed for you 250 Lt. salary and 100 Lt. traveling expenses. How is it possible, then, that 400 Lt. has been mentioned to you? And who has told you that?"

Now I knew how the appearances should be saved; I understood how bitter the pill must have been for the government to learn that the Russian minister in The Hague had mentioned those conditions in the presence of the minister of foreign affairs. On the other hand, it did not do to keep this secret and to accept that so-much-smaller salary. Besides, how did I know that Ostrorog had complete knowledge of it?

Hoff was sitting by silently: he had immediately decided for the affair in Bergen, now knowing exactly what the conditions were, and therefore he could not guess at all what to do. It speaks for itself, however, that I had to say everything. One can imagine how Ostrorog, who completely revelled in the Turkish political life, but was not Oriental enough to keep his face in check, was surprised . . . "Yes, I have to go immediately, then, to the Grand Vizir in order to report that." He returned in low spirits: the Grand Vizir had not understood it at all. I insisted now on telegraphing our minister of foreign affairs for information . . . No, the Turkish government did not consider that necessary, but it was not understood at all how the Russian envoy could have said such a thing: after all, it was the Turkish government who decided this, and the amounts accepted had not been changed.

We took the draft contract with us.<sup>14</sup> I asked Ostrorog to inform the government that I could not sign this contract before we knew the instructions, as intended in the note of 8 February, 1914. I assured him

<sup>13</sup>The Note of February 8, which was in the possession of Westenenk (Westenenk papers).

<sup>14</sup>This draft-contract consisted of six articles related to the general conditions of appointment and not to the authority of the inspectors-general (Westenenk papers).

time and again that my primary object was *not* the financial side of the matter, but the matter itself, the work and the possibility of doing it properly were my main interests, and that therefore I had to insist first on taking cognizance of the competences one was intending to confer upon us by instruction. By keeping silent, Hoff agreed with this.

It was a very unpleasant day: what had happened was surely embarrassing to the Turkish government.

To our surprise, as early as evening a letter arrived from Ostrorog, saying:

*Je suis heureux de vous faire connaître que Son Altesse le Grand Vézir, à qui j'ai eu l'honneur de faire part de notre entretien, trouve tout naturel votre désir d'une conversation sur les attributions dont le Gouvernement impérial compte vous revêtir pour l'accomplissement de votre importante mission.*

*J'ai en conséquence l'honneur de vous prier de vouloir bien vous rendre à mon cabinet après demain jeudi à deux heures de l'après midi.*

[I am glad to let you know that His Highness the Grand Vizir, whom I have had the honor to inform about our meeting, considers your wish as natural to have a conversation on the competences which the Imperial Government intends to confer upon you for the fulfillment of your important mission.

I have, therefore, the honor to ask you to come to my cabinet the day after tomorrow, Thursday, at two o'clock p.m.]

I discussed the draft contract of the government with our minister; he plainly called it a scandal. On his advice we decided to consult a lawyer and the minister called for the lawyer of the legation, Mr. Spitzer, an Austrian, put the affair before him, after which we asked him to make a counter-draft.

[On the draft contract of the government are the comments of our minister for Spitzer, indeed a proof of his share in this matter.]

*Wednesday, 6 May.* Visited the ambassadors with Hoff. We only found those of France and Russia.

The French ambassador Bompard promised us all necessary help, but referred us especially to the Russian ambassador. I told him that I had refused to sign the contract before we knew the instruction. I also informed him that we had paid a visit to the minister Doumergue, upon which he said, "Oh, yes," from which we concluded that at Paris one had kept one's word.

The Russian ambassador, Mr. de Giers, wanted to know all the ins and outs. He agreed with me with regard to the salary; however, he was only very surprised about Mr. Swetchine saying: "I have not spoken or written of 400 Lt., but of 250 . . . *mais insistez toujours, il faut toujours marchander avec les Turcs . . . malheureusement . . .*" [but always insist, one must always bargain with the Turks . . . unfortunately.] "I will always support you. Consider the Russian embassy as completely friendly ground."

And up to three times the assurance: "We don't want the inspectors-general to get involved in politics; that is why we want them neutral. As long as Turkey wants peace, Russia will never occupy Armenia, but we want rest at our border and in the adjacent provinces."

In the afternoon we were visited by a deputation on behalf of the Armenian patriarch.

Ms.: Visited all six ministers. Fortunately, spoke with the ministers of France (Bompart) and Russia (de Giers) . . . The French ambassador said that the Grand Vizir and Talaat Bey had spoken very highly about us . . . The Russian ambassador said that neither of them had come to him in order to complain about my troublesome attitude. But had not Ostrorog come to the ambassador? Did not the French ambassador know through his Russian colleague that there were difficulties? . . .

*Thursday, 7 May.* At two o'clock Ostrorog brought us to Talaat. His secretary (Ali Munif Bey, former secretary of the Young Turkish Committee) and Khalil Bey, *le président du conseil d'état* [president of the privy council], president of the parliament, were also present.

The air was oppressive: apparently because of what had happened on Tuesday.

Ostrorog read out the draft instruction or, better, he rattled it off, so that it could hardly be followed.<sup>15</sup>

Among each other they all spoke only Turkish, including Ostrorog. After the reading we were asked if vital points presented themselves for discussion.

I answered that we hoped to be able to study the draft at ease, but still would like to ask something. I said that it had struck me that several principles had been taken over from the note of 8 February, but that other important points were missing, among others there being talk of the *Hamidiye* — regiments. (Only afterward I understood what delicate point I had touched upon there; firstly, since it concerned armed Kurds, who were flattered by the Turks and constituted the big counter-balance over the Armenians; secondly, since it concerned an army reform, therefore something with which the famous minister of war, Enver Pasha, was directly concerned.)

I also asked for clearer indication of the identities of the subaltern officials, mentioned in the note as well, and asked for more explicit indication of our competence, especially with regard to the foreign "specialists" who would be placed at our disposal.

"*Hamidiye*?" Talaat Bey said, "Not necessary at all to include that; subaltern officials will be given [a list was read out to us in Turkish]. Foreign specialists? Why? They even don't know the language; we have specialists for you."

<sup>15</sup>The draft-instructions consisted of 22 articles, based on the note of February 8 (Westenenk papers).

Since the air was not particularly favorable, I did not proceed. Still the mood of Talaat was not hostile; he was a man who did appreciate honest opposition, and when I asked him if I could take the draft instruction along with me, he said: "All right, then draw up all the questions that present themselves, and then we will deal with them together."

When, having returned, I studied the instruction (appendix), I noticed that it still required important completion, but I felt convinced for the first time that we would succeed after all. It was only most disagreeable to have to bargain with the Turkish government about every point in such a way, something I had not expected in the least.

In the evening Toukholka came; he already knew everything; how, I did not understand, but afterward I knew that the Porte had complained. Toukholka came to tell me that the Russian ambassador was of the opinion that I had to proceed calmly . . . that with regard to foreign specialists, for instance, as chief clerk, I had to accept a Turk, and that then I could even count on three European secretaries; this, he pointed out, was the way to follow, *sauver la façade* [to save appearances].

Ms.: . . . He [Ostrorog] brought us to Talaat Bey, accompanied by his secretary, and *le président du conseil d'état*, a flashy fat young fellow called Khalil Bey, also joined us, being a cocky ass . . . I was completely frozen with anger, since they constantly talked Turkish and the fat vulgar fellow behaved so offensively. Hoff was teased again for his French: "Please do speak English," etc., etc. . .

*Friday, 8 May.* In connection with a draft instruction formerly drawn up by or on behalf of the patriarch for the "European governor-general of Armenia" [comp. 21 April],<sup>16</sup> I had made notes on the draft instruction given to me. I offered something to our minister, and the following days we worked on a counter-draft instruction.

Ms.: In the morning I told everything to our minister, who would thoroughly study the draft instruction and my notes. We went for a walk together, climbed the Galata Tower, came down and went through a "tunnel" upstairs again . . . Found . . . invitation for a *soirée* next Wednesday organized by the French ambassador.

*Saturday, 9 May.* Worked with the envoy.

*Sunday, 10 May.* With one of the Bosphorus boats via Bebek and Therapia to Bujükdere, we could see the Black Sea — lovely.

*Monday and Tuesday, 11 and 12 May.* Worked on draft contract with Spitzer and draft instruction with the envoy.

<sup>16</sup>Should be April 24 (see note 10).

*Wednesday, 13 May.* The same. In the evening, a *soirée* at the French ambassador Bompard's residence; *tour de valse* [waltz]; saw also the ambassador of Austria and told him everything.

*Thursday, 14 May.* On the advice of our minister the Russian chargé d'affaires, Gulkevich, had been invited by Mr. de Willebois in order to take cognizance of our counter-draft. (The Russian ambassador and Talaat had gone to Livadia in order to welcome the Czar.)

Mr. Gulkevich completely agreed with this draft . . . ; he was afraid, however, that the inspectors-general would not be accorded the right to propose the vali's dismissal together with the demand that this dismissal should take effect within a month. In this connection, the Powers had had no success in obtaining more than was maintained in the note of 8 February.

As Toukholka had said: the inspectors-general already had the authority to dismiss all subaltern officials; in this way the functioning of the valis could indeed be rendered impossible. I conceded this to him and Hoff, who agreed with Toukholka, but I argued that we should still try it once; the dismissal of all subaltern officials was undoubtedly a means of crippling the vali, but with him the whole government as well, and instead of establishing peace and order this would *planter de désordre* [plant disorder].

*Ms.:* Many visits during these days, and worked a lot. When everything was ready, read out the whole thing to the Russian chargé d'affaires . . . ; he completely agreed. He was afraid, however, that the inspectors-general would not be given the right to propose the vali's dismissal and that this must be effected by the minister of the interior within a month after the proposal. In this connection, the Powers had not been successful. In case of need this may be included in a secret clause. Hoff talked to the first dragoman Toukholka; the latter was of the opinion that we already had enough authority by being able to dismiss *all other* officials, whereby the vali would be crippled. This was correct, but the objective of the reforms was to build up and not to pull down, and to dismiss all the officials in order to "badger" the vali was indeed no way to promote progress; *c'est planter de désordre*.

At two o'clock I attended the opening of the Turkish parliament. The sultan was a pitiful, old, squarely-fat-stuffed, childish little monkey — a disgustingly miserable appearance. We had received a Turkish invitation . . . we were seated in the first row in the box for officials, so we were the only Europeans among all the people with fezzes.

*Friday, 15 May.* Our version, the counter-draft instruction, presented.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup>The draft-instructions consisted of 23 articles giving detailed arrangements of the competences of the inspectors-general (Westenenk papers).

*Ms.*: Sent draft instruction to *Comte* [Count] Ostrorog.

*Saturday, 16 May.* Presented to our minister of foreign affairs my petition to H.M. the Queen, asking for permission to take service under a foreign government.

*Ms.*: Dealt with the draft contract with the envoy and afterward sent to Spitzer. In the evening, dinner with the English ambassador.

Sent to Minister Loudon for processing (after receiving his telegram, which I acknowledged) my request to the Queen to take service under a foreign government, for the reason "that he would be pleased to accept the difficult task waiting for him in Armenia, since he is convinced that he will be able to serve and to promote great European interests and the interests of suffering races, especially of the Christian Armenians."

*Sunday, 17 May.* Walked with the Cators at Therapia. Cator is the English itinerant judge, up to and including Egypt, Bagdad . . .

*Monday, 18 May.* The preceding day Talaat had asked us to come and discuss the instruction. Now this minister further dealt with the affairs with us and no longer only Ostrorog. (As became apparent afterward, we owed this to the fact that I had complained to Mr. de Giers that Ostrorog had been given the mandate to negotiate with us on behalf of the government. After that the Russian ambassador had visited the Grand Vizir in order to ask him to put an end to this and to invite Talaat Bey himself to discuss the matters with us; Mr. de Giers informed me about this.) Talaat Bey informed us that the government now was making a further draft after having received our draft. He invited us to return on Thursday, but he hoped to sign everything.

"But tomorrow you will still get a draft contract from us." "Oh," Talaat said, "your salary, we don't object to that . . ." Hoff was so much struck by this last announcement that he now proposed to me to sign whatever the government placed before us. I suggested to him not to do this; of course, much of what we had proposed in our counter-instruction we would not obtain, but if one did not ask for much it was not possible to obtain "rather much." Had not everyone told us: "Patience, *insistez toujours, il faut marchander*," etc. [we should not get discouraged, the instruction was still of greater importance than the salary], etc.?

*Tuesday, 19 May.* Presented the counter-draft contract made by Spitzer.<sup>18</sup>

*Thursday, 21 May.* A decisive day. Both Hoff and I had this feeling. But again he did not agree with me, and this time he had put in writing a sort of address, which I reproduce herewith. I don't do this in order to

<sup>18</sup>This draft-contract consisted of eight articles (Westenenk papers).



ridicule my Norwegian colleague, who was not at all accustomed to associating with Oriental people; but the content of the piece expresses his mood to remain at all costs good friends and demonstrates how little cooperation I got from him. In explanation of his mood I must point out that Hoff had burned his boats and that he very much feared that everything would still go wrong because of my insisting on sufficient authority, and on a proper instruction.

The piece by Hoff reads verbatim:

*Je trouve que les avantages, que nous avons jusqu'ici obtenus vis-à-vis du gouvernement turc ne valent pas la situation moins agréable, dans laquelle nous sommes venus par froisser le gouvernement en exigeant plusieurs droits au dehors du traité de 8 février que nous avons été plus tard obligés de céder. Le mieux moyen pour rétablir notre position est donc selon mon opinion de dire aujourd'hui: "Votre Excellence — Nous savons très bien que les instructions sont un point de deuxième rang et que la possibilité de réussir là-bas réellement dépend de l'appui, que nous donne le gouvernement turc. Nous avons tâché Votre Excellence de secourir, tant que possible les travaux méthodiques non seulement sous le gouvernement présent — dont nous savons avoir l'appui — mais aussi sous un autre gouvernement au futur. Le gouvernement a trouvé difficile de nous donner une telle sécurité et c'est un point que nous ne pouvons réellement exiger. En pleine confiance aux promesses que nous a de donné Votre Excellence et le Ministre des Finances nous voulons donc tâcher de travailler là-bas avec les instructions, que nous a envoyées S. E. le Comte Ostrorog et nous ferons tout notre possible pour nous mettre au courant des affaires et pouvoir proposer devant le gouvernement les réformes nécessaires."* [I am of the opinion that the advantages, which we have obtained until now from the Turkish government, don't counter-balance the less pleasant situation into which we have fallen by offending the government by demanding several rights not to be found in the contract of 8 February and which we have been forced afterward to give up. In my opinion, therefore, the best way to redress our position is to say today: "Your Excellency — We know very well that the instructions are an item of second order and that the possibility really to succeed there depends on the support given by the Turkish government. We have tried, Your Excellency, to assist as far as possible in methodical work not only under the present government — whose support we know we have — but also under another government in the future. The government has considered it difficult to give us such an assurance and it is a point which we cannot really demand. Having every confidence in the promises given to us by Your Excellency and the minister of finance, we will therefore try to work there in accordance with the instructions sent to us by H.E. Count Ostrorog and we will do whatever is possible to start work and to be able to propose to the government the necessary reforms."]

So apologizing, declaring that the instructions were of secondary importance, accepting the draft sent to us by Ostrorog and proposing from Armenia the necessary reforms . . . that is broadly the content of the piece.

I gave Hoff as my answer to this that I would prefer to go my own way, that I could not demand of him to go along with me through thick

and thin, but that I could not think of backing out of it. He then decided to continue in my company after all.

At two o'clock we were at the Porte.

We began having a conversation with Ostrorog; he informed us, addressing himself exclusively to me, that our counter-draft and counter-instruction had just been dealt with in the cabinet council and that the government was of the opinion that we [I] had assumed a superior tone and that I should clearly realize that I was not a state. For I should not have demanded:

- 1) a guarantee by the Ottoman Bank (art. 7 draft contract);
- 2) compensation in case the Turkish government defaulted (draft contract art. 6);
- 3) that the specialists could be appointed *sur la désignation ou avec l'adhésion de l'inspecteur-général* [according to the direction or with the approval of the inspector-general]. (Draft instruction, art. 23.)

Ostrorog, acting like the offended majesty, made a deep impression on Hoff; if he had addressed himself to him, Hoff would have yielded and the situation would have become very complicated. When I was silent for a moment, Ostrorog continued that he had to advise us to give this up, since the Young Turks were greatly offended by calling into question that they, who were priding themselves in meeting all their obligations, would not honor them with regard to us. Who had advised me to demand that security? Certainly not someone who was informed on the policy of the Young Turks.

Our envoy had especially asked me to say, if possible, that I had consulted a lawyer for drawing up the draft, a private affair, since in cases like these, one looks for someone who is legally and locally knowledgeable. So, I said this, and this immediately eased the tension. Suddenly I understood that they had been afraid of diplomatic interference; that I had been incited by Russia, for instance.

"*N'insistez-pas, monsieur, je vous en prie, vous trouverez un mur,*" [Don't insist, sir, please, you will meet with a wall] this he repeatedly and very earnestly said. And, when he said after this, "For I am also a foreigner in Turkish service and if I assure you that the government has always paid us under the most difficult circumstances and especially makes a point of honor in that . . ." And when I considered that Marshal Liman von Sanders Pasha, General Bauman Pasha and the chief engineer Picard had told me the same, I had to answer: "Well, if that is the case, there is no need to uphold these articles."

"But," I added to this, "I don't understand why the cabinet council has become angry about the third point, since what I have asked there is already granted by one of the laws."

"*Plait-il!*" [What did you say?]: very surprised.

"Yes, I have done nothing else than taking over from article 4 *des ar-*

*articles additionels de la loi sur les vilayets*" [the additional articles of the law on the vilayets]. (This minor law had been given to me by the Armenians in Holland; the four additional articles were printed on a separate leaflet.)

Immediately Ostrorog looked for the articles in question but, oh wonder, they were nowhere to be found at the ministries. They had not been found yet when we went together to Talaat Bey. The minister looked very serious, but Ostrorog reported what we had discussed (in Turkish), as I noticed from some words and the clearing up of Talaat's face. A moment later Enver Pasha, the minister of war, who apparently wanted to get informed, came as well. He was also given an explanation, but now still remained point three, and to my amusement the ministers were not convinced by my contention, and article 4 of the addition to the law on the vilayets had to be looked for. After a while an official came with a long face and with a paper in his hands. The two ministers, secretary Ali Numif Bey and Ostrorog, bent over it and one of them read out: "*Il sera adjoint aux inspecteurs généraux des fonctionnaires et spécialistes, qui seront nommés sur leur désignation ou avec leur adhésion*" [There will be added to the inspectors-general officials and specialists, who will be appointed according to their discretion or with their adhesion].

"*Oui* [Yes]," Talaat said, "*vous avez raison*" [you are right], and with a smile: "*Vous connaissez bien nos lois*" [You are well acquainted with our laws].

Enver Pasha left and we discussed the subjects. At the end of our discussions Talaat said: "As you may know I have to leave for Bucharest next Saturday; can everything be ready tomorrow? I am going now to the sultan; can I tell him that everything is finished?" He looked now at Hoff, who suddenly said, "*Oui*." "*Eh bien*," Talaat said, pointing at the draft contract of the government, "*Fini! signez-la*" [Well, finished? Sign there], upon which I hastened to remind Hoff that article 23 had still to be dealt with completely.

"No," he then said, "That is correct; that was not the intention." We asked, however, the minister to report to the sultan that we were *almost* finished.

After that the minister left and I asked Ostrorog to give us another hour the next day in order to discuss the final affairs.

*Ms.*: . . . Talaat said: "*Vous connaissez bien nos lois!*" [You are well acquainted with our laws!] "*Oui, monsieur le ministre, assez bien!*" [Yes, minister, rather well!] I said, but did not say that I had received the data (the law) from Zavriev and Pastermajian.

*Friday, 22 May.* With Ostrorog in the Cercle d'Orient we discussed the last points of major importance. To my surprise Hoff declared at twelve o'clock that he had an appointment with the second dragoman

of the German embassy and left, leaving me alone with Ostrorog. The latter kept silent, but I noticed his surprise about this show of interest.

Ostrorog made the proposal to ask Talaat to initial our contracts and instructions before his departure to Bucharest and to give herewith the minister the satisfaction to have finished with the matter. This would happen, then, the next day and the Grand Vizir could sign the documents with us on Sunday.

This was agreed upon.

That day I went to the Russian embassy in order to give information on some matters.

I had already informed the Russian ambassador, with whom I talked time and again, about the question of the guarantee of the payment of our salary. Of course, there could be no question of guaranteeing on paper by the Powers since the appearance should be upheld that Turkey herself had wanted the reforms in Armenia. Mr. de Giers was only able to say: "When it becomes evident, for instance, on the third day of the month, that you are not paid, they you only have to telegraph me and I guarantee you that you will be paid."

During the course of the day I began thinking of the invidious last paragraph of article 5 of the contract, created by my second sentence of paragraph 1 of article 6.

That second sentence of paragraph 1 of article 6 had been admitted on the advice of our envoy and if his wish was fulfilled that the instruction would form an essential part of the contract, it certainly would have made sense.

But one had let it immediately be known that that would be out of the question, and I realized now that it would be a good move to give up that sentence now; through that the government would be morally obliged to abandon the last paragraph of article 5.<sup>19</sup>

Ms.: . . . At twelve o'clock Hoff declared suddenly that he had an appointment and had to leave . . . One can imagine what impression that made on Ostrorog: exactly now the tug of war began . . . this indeed was proof of the great interest and the high sense of duty of my colleague . . .

*Saturday, 23 May.* It was done in this way: the ministers Talaat Bey and Enver Pasha were pleased at this turn; also the end of the first paragraph of article 5 was abandoned.

Ostrorog said: the government now realizes that the "six-month compensation" in case of illness, etc. was too little — *parole d'honneur* [word of honor] — he said to talk with the Grand Vizir about it. To leave this point blank when we initialed the documents with Talaat was not possible; however, one could not paraph blanks. We initialed, and Talaat Bey expressed his satisfaction that things were set-

<sup>19</sup>The articles referred to were related to conditions of payment.

tled by now. No one was more pleased, however, than Hoff, who declared to be very tired, but he thanked me emphatically for all the trouble.

When paraphing it was also decided that the northern sector of Armenia with the capital Erzerum was to be assigned to me, while Hoff would govern the southern sector.

Though Hoff had said from the very beginning: "You are married and have children, I am not — so you take the northern sector, which is less out-of-the-way from the rest of the world," the last days he had expressed in a very vague way his doubts whether the Turkish government indeed wanted this arrangement. He now expressed a great surprise and confessed that the German ambassador von Wangenheim, who dealt with the Norwegian interests in Turkey, had told him some days ago that Hoff would get the northern sector and that he had arranged this with Talaat at dinner at the embassy. The question was whether Germany wanted special influence in the northern sector; why then had Talaat not kept his word? Perhaps this will be cleared up later.

*Ms.*: . . . Ostrorog said: the government now realizes that the "six months" in case of illness and death was too little; we would leave, however, things as they were, *parole d'honneur*, he would consult the Grand Vizir about it and certainly that could still be changed, but now first initial; to leave it blank could not be done with a contract. All right! . . . Hoff also (very happy), and though he did not have the slightest part in anything, said he was tired. We telegraphed the news to all concerned. I also telegraphed minister Loudon now to have my request for permission to enter a foreign service dealt with. After the initialing I said to the minister: "Now that we have signed I can ask you how much can we promise our private secretary that we are now going to look for?" "50 Lt." "That seems to me too little; please give him 100 Lt." "My dear Westenenk, we don't have money!" "I know that and it is not my intention to import Dutch colonists, but we must still have some moral support, etc." "I will give him 80 Lt." "And traveling expenses?" "Yes, traveling expenses, 20 Lt." Together then, 100.

*Sunday, 24 May.* Before signing the documents with the Grand Vizir we checked everything with Mr. Ostrorog. "And what about that matter of six months' compensation?" I said to him.

"Yes, sure, we will discuss that presently with the Grand Vizir."

The Grand Vizir was also very satisfied. We talked of one thing and another, the documents were signed without the Grand Vizir having read them or having them read out, and the "six months" remained pending.

Because of the animated conversation, I had not thought about it any

more; the matter had been put into the hands of Ostrorog, and I considered everything settled. Had Hoff forgotten it as well? Perhaps Ostrorog, too (?) . . .

We still tried to speak to Ostrorog about it, but in vain; he was not to be found anywhere until our departure.

But this was merely a financial question, and not an affair of primary importance. The Armenian mission had suffered no loss through this move by Ostrorog, who had thus taken his revenge (18 May).

*Monday, 25 May.* The genesis of article 23 of the instruction becomes sufficiently evident from the various drafts.<sup>20</sup> Though this article had been obtained with much pain, not all of the discussion had been recorded. This also referred to some points which I have had to skip. What the recommendations of our envoy were with regard to these points becomes evident from his notes (appendix). Speculations about this are only of value when the question is judged from the point of view of whether I have attempted to obtain more authority than was allowed; they are of value, therefore, to Nubar Pasha and those Armenians who would have very much liked to see the Turkish government humiliated. Intoxicated by the success implied by the note of the Great Powers, those Armenians do not sufficiently realize that no cooperation of the Turks can be obtained through humiliation, a factor which is of the utmost importance for the well-being of Armenia. It is true that the content of the note means a total victory over the old Turkish regime, but this should not be evidenced by the position of the inspector-general to a degree that the reforms appear offensive to the Turks. Give and take should therefore be placed against the saving of the appearance by the other party.

Before our departure to Holland, fixed on this day, I paid a visit to all ministers and discussed with the ministers of agriculture and public works the engagement of Dutch specialists; they promised to speak about it in the cabinet council. General Bauman did not object to the appointment of a Dutch officer as gendarme officer with the view of appointing him afterward as my aide-de-camp (art. 23, instruction).

At 6:15 I left by the Orient Express.

On the train an undersecretary of foreign affairs came and brought me 300 Lt., *frais d'installation* [installation costs], which I should have received immediately after signing the contract.

*Ms.:* Since I wanted to speak with the ministers of public works and of agriculture in order to obtain *foreign* specialists, I asked Hoff to go to Ostrorog to ask him to give a definite answer to the question: "Has the Grand Vizir himself laid down that the compensation in case of illness and death will be six months or not?"

<sup>20</sup>This article was related to the officials and specialists to be assigned to the inspector-general.

Hoff went there twice; Ostrorog was not at his office and was to be found nowhere. From my side I am convinced that he simply had put off the doltish Hoff, knowing full well that he had deceived us (me, anyhow) with regard to that point in a dirty way.

I went to the public works. The minister said that already two Ottoman inspectors had been assigned for us, so it was difficult. I pleaded the necessity. Well, he would see once more what the cabinet council would say; since it had already decided the matter, he did not have the right to change it on his own. Of course, I was too polite to say at this point: yes, but without my adhesion *no one* can be appointed! After this, I went to Picard, who was working at this ministry and asked him to telegraph me. At the ministry of agriculture the same concern. However, he was more yielding. The honest Arab El Bortamü said he liked Holland very much. I wrote my address in his special address booklet; he would telegraph me. Then to Bauman with the request to appoint some Dutch officers, but to give some of them to me as aides-de-camp. "All right! carry out your proposal!" Emoluments: majors 41 Lt. plus around 30 Lt. traveling costs . . . Only 1500 fr., for equipment and journey to Constantinople.

In the afternoon visits to the ministers of finance, education, justice, war, navy, and almost late for the train; almost everywhere setbacks.

*Thursday, 28 May. Arrival at Deventer.*

Since it was difficult to escape the journalists completely I used the press to give the following information:

As foreign specialists appointed on the indication of the inspector-general [will be] a secretary, an aide-de-camp, an inspector for public works and an inspector for agriculture and mining. Their emoluments are not yet definitely fixed, but will be substantial. It goes without saying that our Dutchman will prefer to choose for these posts compatriots, if they meet the requirements of being thoroughly fluent in the French language, in addition to high professional qualifications.

*Friday, 29 May.* To The Hague to wait upon the minister of foreign affairs.

*Tuesday, 2 June.* To London in order to purchase at the Army and Navy stores tents and complete equipment for life during the summer in the inhospitable Armenian mountainous country, and winter equipment fit for 30° frost.

[Ms.: Will be sent on 10 June.]

*Thursday, 4 June.* Back to Deventer. Piles of applications were awaiting for me here. The first Dutch candidate for secretary, Mr. O.L. Torley Duwel, had joined the journey from Vienna to Frankfurt. He had already been proposed as a candidate by Professor Mr. O. van Vollenhoven when he was still in Constantinople.

*Monday, 8 June.* Proposed by telegraph Torley Duwel to the Porte; was already appointed the next day.

From Bohos Nubar Pasha a letter from Egypt saying that he had hoped to be in Paris the 15th, after that would go to Holland and hoped to see me.<sup>21</sup> Answered that I would be in The Hague on the 18th.

*Saturday, 13 June.* Telegraphed to the chief engineer Picard in Constantinople: "*Veillez télégraphier l'opinion du gouvernement engagement l'inspecteur des travaux publics hollandais. Candidats excellents.*" [Please telegraph the opinion of the government on the Dutch inspector for public works. Excellent candidates.]

Picard never replied, but the affair was later settled (8 July).

Received the information from the minister of agriculture at Constantinople that the Turkish government did not at the moment wish to appoint a Dutch agricultural specialist.

*Monday, 15 June.* To The Hague. Informed the minister of foreign affairs the next day about the arrival of Nubar Pasha.

*Thursday, 18 June.* Paid a visit to the Russian envoy Swetchine. He pointed out that it was necessary for me to have a reliable authority in Constantinople, with whom I could continually be in contact. He mentioned the ambassador of Russia.

I could answer to this that I had agreed with Mr. de Giers, that my secretaries could, when necessary, inform his consuls in Armenia about events that the Great Powers should necessarily know, and that Mr. de Giers had promised an increase in the number of Russian consuls in Armenia.

(Ms.: On 18 June Swetchine had said to me: you should have a reliable person in Constantinople, someone who can intervene if there are difficulties. And then had added straight away: for instance, the Russian ambassador! Politely but flatly I had refused then [in order to avoid compromising later on by producing letters, etc.] and said: I have already told Mr. de Giers that I prefer to make use of the consuls. Not that I have to always tell them everything, but my staff can do that, and it is better for all parties concerned. One *had* to admit this.)

The Russian envoy expressed his regret that in the contract the possibility of dismissal had been admitted, while in practice that would indeed not be possible without the will of the Great Powers.

Besides this, the "note" of 8 February dictated (9th passage) that in case of a possible vacancy within ten years the Great Powers would again propose a new inspector-general and they were then free, for instance, to propose once more as their candidate an official who had been dismissed by Turkey!

I then told the Russian envoy about the difficulties, about the

<sup>21</sup>This letter was dated May 31 and written from Heliopolis in Egypt (Westenenk papers).



peremptory position taken up by the Turkish government with regard to this and some other points, and the lack of *direct* assistance from the side of the ambassadors, who were indeed urgently and officially requested to keep out of the affairs.

I also told the Russian envoy that I had continually discussed everything with our envoy in Constantinople, and that the latter did not have the least objection to the right of "dismissal," even considering this as a matter of course, just like the lawyer Spitzer, whom I had consulted for the contract.

I had to concede that it did not tally with the spirit of the note, but I had considered it a theoretical necessity that this clause was admitted, in order to save completely the appearance that the Turks wanted these reforms themselves.

Talaat Bey had said to me: "*c'est une stipulation académique*" [it is an academic stipulation], but he decidedly insisted on it.

And further, if the possibility of dismissal were *not* admitted in the contract, how would it then have been possible to stipulate that compensation would be paid out to me, when the Turkish government, through unforeseen circumstances, and notwithstanding all theoretical guarantees of the Great Powers, would *after all* dismiss me from my office?

In the afternoon Boghos Nubar Pasha arrived. Torley Duwel welcomed him at the station and informed him there that I was staying at the Hotel des Indes. He also lodged at the hotel, so that we were able to discuss a lot during the evening and the next day.

*Friday, 19 June.* Nubar Pasha had come to tell me that he was not very satisfied with the instruction and the contract.

- 1) The right of dismissal could not be kept in existence.
- 2) The admitted list of superior officials was much too long.
- 3) The Porte had the rights included in the note considerably beaten down by stipulating several times that for some actions of the inspectors-general, the vali's consent was needed, while several important principles in the note had not been adopted by the instruction.
- 4) He would insure that the Great Powers changed something and would visit the capitals for that purpose, especially Berlin and Petrograd. At Paris the government already completely agreed with him.

I gave him the following answers:

- 1) With regard to point one, I told him the same as I had to the Russian envoy.
- 2) I admitted the possibility that we had been deceived in this respect, but how could we have prevented this, since we did not know yet the circumstances and the foreign titles, while Ostrorog had postponed the filling in of the statement with regard to the

superior officials until the last moment on the last day. As became evident now, he had done this on purpose, in order not to give us the opportunity to make enquiries about this elsewhere. But this point I did not consider of paramount importance, since in practice it would soon become evident what should be done when applying this article.

- 3) With the instruction in my hand I demonstrated to Nubar that he was mistaken with regard to that point; also his copy was not completely brought up to date, since he had a copy of the draft paraphrased with Talaat, where art. 28 was mentioned only unclearly.
- 4) I expressed my hope that Nubar would succeed, if he thought changes were necessary, in attaining the main object, but I pointed out that, after all, the ambassadors in Constantinople did the job, that indeed their governments could give instructions, but that they had to take into account on the spot the situation of the moment; and that I had got the impression that the position of the Turkish government was more firm and calm than at the beginning of the year, when the note was drawn up. I also pointed out to him the visit of Talaat to the czar in Livadia.

I also pointed out to Nubar that it was very curious indeed that the ambassadors had after all agreed to give up all direct assistance at our arrival on the third of May and with the negotiations about the contract and the instruction, and so with the beginning of the execution of the reforms.

He answered to this that indeed the moment was not so favorable any more as at the beginning of the year. He would, however, insist in his contacts with the governments that the relationship between the Great Powers and the inspectors-general should really become evident officially; he would take care that the note be officially handed to us by the ambassadors, being the basis, and the only basis, of the reforms. In fact, the Powers had nothing to do with our instruction, only the note being operative (see 6 July for the results of his meddling).

To that I could only say that that instruction had been laid down with the note itself and that with, among others, art. 23, we had obtained a lot.

When considering the attitude of Nubar Pasha it should not be forgotten that he was of great importance to the Armenians; their counsel.

He, the very intelligent and very wealthy organizer and "founder of cities" (with a Belgian he had founded Heliopolis in the midst of the sand of the desert), had completely identified himself with the question; he had tasted the pleasure and the fame of the "victory," and could now hardly tolerate that the consequences of the victory gained did not correspond in all parts with what he had hoped or with what had been held out to the Armenian people (comp. also 25 May).

On the advice of Minister Loudon I visited all the ministries, but could only meet the minister of the interior, Cort van der Linden, and the minister of the navy, Rambonnet.

In the evening back to Deventer.

*Sunday, 21 June.* A telegram from Her Majesty's adjutant on duty, van Rappard, with the information that H.M. the Queen expected me the next day at eleven o'clock at the Loo palace.

The minister of foreign affairs had talked with H.M. about Armenia and me, whereupon Her Majesty had been pleased to receive me in private audience.

With regard to the Armenian mission, H.M. said to consider it an honor that Holland had been invited to put forward candidates and to be pleased that an Indian civil servant had been chosen since that Dutchman could now show the world how Dutchmen in our Dutch Indies govern Mohammedans; also for our subjects in the Dutch Indies H.M. considered it a good thing that Turkey had appointed a Dutch civil servant.

*Ms.: "Well" — hands shaken at the door — "I wish you much success and hope that you will be able to do a lot in the interest of the country and the people, and for our reputation, for Holland and for the Dutch Indies."*

*Tuesday, 23 June.* Her Majesty informed by telegram that she now also wanted to make the acquaintance of Mrs. Westenenk.

*Thursday, 25 June.* This audience took place today.

I went by train to Amersfoort, where I had a meeting with the candidate for aide-de-camp, First Lieutenant Wolfson.

*Monday, 29 June.* Through Berlin to Constantinople. Torley Duwel accompanied me. At Berlin the Armenian Greenfield stood waiting for the train with an open letter from Nubar in Petrograd with the information that he had also had success in Petrograd.<sup>22</sup> It was evident that Nubar had talked about my remarks in the Armenian society in Berlin, since to my surprise Greenfield said: "So you can count on it that all the governments agree and if the ambassadors in Constantinople don't

<sup>22</sup>In this letter, dated June 27, Nubar says that the Russian government is determined that the reforms will be loyally and completely executed. Russia refused to recognize new instructions of the Porte, which contradicted the agreement of February 8. It would also not be accepted that the role of the inspectors-general would be reduced by the Porte to one of a simple Ottoman official without any responsibility toward the Powers. Boghos Nubar had sent a letter, dated June 23, to Westenenk from Berlin saying that he had had a conversation with Zimmerman (deputy under-secretary of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs). According to Nubar, Zimmerman had promised all his support to underline the international character of the position of the inspectors-general and that he would give Wangenheim corresponding instructions. Nubar mentioned that the same promise had also been made by the French government (Westenenk papers).

cooperate [something I had not said] you should be disappointed because of this."

At Hannover we read the news of the murder of the Archduke of Austria and his consort in Sarajewo by a youthful grammar school pupil.

No one could then surmise yet that the World War of 1914 would result from this act.

*Tuesday, 30 June.* The Dutch Consul General Fledderus and his wife, Mr. Swaters, and Baron Témesvári Vest, a Hungarian, all acquaintances of Torley Duwel, were at the station in Budapest and we had lunch together.

Mr. Swaters, a Dutch engineer, director of a company for the construction of waterworks established in Budapest, and now engaged in providing Trebizond with a drinking-water plant, informed me that he had received, some days ago, a telegram from the vali of Erzerum saying that for that town as well a waterworks was required. Mr. Swaters had answered that he was disposed to do the survey work for it for some 30,000 crowns.

The vali had let him know that for those waterworks 30,000 Lt. were available (around £325,000); that is, that half of it was in hand and that the other half "was almost allowed by the minister concerned."

From stories by Armenians, I knew that it was highly necessary to renew the existing conduit pipes in Erzerum, which were decaying and lying open everywhere, but it was very peculiar that this was suddenly begun *now*, just before my arrival. From where did one suddenly get 15,000 Lt.?

*Thursday, 2 July.* Arrival at Constantinople.

Pastermajian welcomed us at the station. He told us that Hoff stayed at Therapia and had not been able to be on time at the station to welcome us.

In Hotel Tokatlian the Norwegians came to visit us. Hoff had his countryman Blehr appointed to the post of secretary. Blehr had previously been secretary at the embassy in Paris and lately secretary of foreign affairs at Christiana. Hoff had placed at his disposal as "attachés" two young men, Dahl and Graf.

It became apparent that Hoff completely agreed with Ostrorog. He had not yet seen the Grand Vizir, although he had been in Constantinople a week. He had met Talaat Bey once, but no business had been conducted yet.

Not only had the hotel bill of May not been refunded by Ostrorog to Hoff, but the latter had begun to tell Ostrorog at their first meeting that he, Hoff, regretted that those difficulties had arisen, and so had more or less apologized.

[On the third of May Essad Bey had taken us to Pera Palace and

discussed everything with the manager, so that the rooms were simply allotted. We were the guests of the government, Ostrorog repeatedly said, and when I said: "All right, but Mrs. Westenenk is no official person, so I would be glad to pay her expenses myself," he answered: "Please, never broach that subject, since the Grand Vizir would absolutely take it ill of you, for you are not undertaking a pleasure trip," etc.)

At our departure the bills were not paid, and the director of the hotel simply seized our luggage. Unfortunately, I was not in the hotel and heard of everything only when we were sitting in the train. I learned then that Hoff had paid the bill for all of us. It goes without saying that we could not accept that. Hoff declared for the time being that he did not want to be refunded for anything; he was convinced that all would be settled immediately after our departure, the more so since the secretary of foreign affairs, who came to bring me the money in the train (25 May, last sentence) was present during the whole affair and had demonstrated in Hoff's presence his great indignation at the behavior of the hotel management.

But when we had returned from London on 6 June and I did not find news from Constantinople or Christiana, I telegraphed Hoff to see if he had any news and after a negative answer I wrote to Ostrorog, saying that I concluded from the lack of information that the government had not been informed of the shameful treatment experienced by us at our departure, and I hastened to warn him.

Having received the letter, he immediately telegraphed: "*Stupéfait, désolé, lettre suit*" [Stupified, sad, letter follows].

Of course, the letter never arrived.

I had completely informed Hoff before his return and behold . . . the first time he met Ostrorog he apologized . . .

Being at the table, I openly said that I considered it a shame that the hotel expenses had not been immediately repaid to him. Mr. Blehr answered to this that Hoff had not yet asked for it (it was apparent that he was not informed at all) and that in his opinion Ostrorog was a man of very great influence. He, Blehr, as a diplomat could judge this. I answered that I highly doubted the latter (his assurance with regard to Ostrorog), and that we at least had gained the experience that all unpleasantnesses had been caused by him, that it had been he who had compiled the list of senior officials, and that it had become evident that we had been deceived in that regard. We were not deceived by the government, but by him. I also said that I considered Ostrorog a very dangerous man, and not in the least for the Turks. The Norwegians did not agree with one thing and another (comp. 9 July). And when I learned that they had allowed themselves to be deprived of the right to designate an aide-de-camp of their own nationality, I said: "*Mais, c'est trop fort ça*" [but that is too much], and then kept quiet, as I understood that Hoff was being completely led by Ostrorog.

In the afternoon we moved into Hotel Summer Palace in Therapia.

*Friday, 3 July.* Wrote a letter to the Grand Vizir to report my arrival and to ask for an appointment for the next day.

*Saturday, 4 July.* The Grand Vizir and Talaat Bey were completely occupied by parliamentary affairs.

*Ms.:* Visited the Grand Vizir on Saturday morning; not at his office, but in the parliament — Talaat also in the chamber . . .

*Sunday, 5 July.* I therefore gave Blehr, who would speak to Talaat, a letter in order to have him fix a day and hour for a conversation. Talaat thereupon let me know that I was welcome on Wednesday and also that he preferred first to settle all affairs with Hoff, and then to begin with me . . . an information I was most pleased with.

*Ms.:* Some time before lunch Graves came and stayed for lunch. After lunch, duty. He had come for three matters:

- 1) The inspector-general has the right to dismiss everyone — great difficulties. I told him that this could only cause difficulties if he did not recognize his own benefit and dismissed all too freely. It was agreed that I would only dismiss the government officials and the civil inspectors directly in exceptional cases, but that I would warn Graves, as chief of the civil service, in normal and trivial cases, etc., after which the latter would take care of the change of staff.
- 2) Inspections of his civil inspectors take place regularly, reports in columns in which the "accused" concerned can defend themselves, their superiors place their remarks, after that the inspector again. A column will be added now for the remarks of the inspector-general.
- 3) Official inquiries. Until now these have been performed by the inspectors of Mr. Graves. This can remain, if I trust him. I can also have my inspector be present at this — but of course I wish to reserve for myself the right to set up an inquiry in exceptional cases, when I deem this to be desirable.

It will be an important point to cooperate with the good European elements at the ministries.

*Monday, 6 July.* Paid a visit to all embassies; only found the ambassadors of France and Russia in. Mr. Bompard apparently had got a critical remark from his government in connection with my talk with Nubar Pasha. At least he immediately began about the contract and instruction and said: "It is a pity that the Turkish government has reserved the right of dismissal in the contract."

"But that is only of theoretical value."

"Yes, but it is still a pity. If you had only followed my advice."

"Followed your advice? What do you mean?"

"Well, I had advised you not to discuss personally with the Turkish government, but to have that done by us, namely, through our doyen, the Russian ambassador."

I was speechless for a moment. "*Il a peur de son ombre.*" [He is afraid of his shadow], Nubar had said of this man. Did he speak now for fear of his government, who had blamed him for not having supported us?

"You only told me on the sixth of May that you promised us all necessary assistance, but that you referred us especially to the Russian ambassador."

"Right, that is it . . ."

"But I have indeed continually consulted with the Russian ambassador, with Gulkevich, with Toukholka, but I still always had to enter into the discussions with the Turkish government myself, without any official intervention by ambassadors."

"*Donc, ils n'étaient pas de mon avis!*" [So, they were not of my opinion?]

"No."

Mr. Bompard seriously shook his head, and talked about other things. He is no friend of the Armenians, but I was of the opinion that he based his judgment too much on the Armenians in the big towns.

Ms.: . . . Bompard showed himself to be a great anti-Armenian ("to have a Turkish friend is conceivable, but an Armenian!!!"). I answered to that: "But the poor rural population, the farmers must be loyal and good." "Well, yes, but *ce sont des bêtes*" [they are animals], upon which I could say: "*c'est vrai, mais c'est pour ces bêtes que nous appliquerons les réformes*" [it is true, but it is for these animals that we will apply the reforms] . . .

On leaving I told him: "There is still much to discuss regarding the specialists, our budget, etc. . . . Who should be conducting these discussions on our behalf?

"Oh, you should do that yourself, since now you have already signed everything."

"But, this does not change the relationship between us and the Powers?"

"No, certainly not, but now you still have to do it yourself." The Russian ambassador frankly admitted that he knew that I had told Nubar and Swetchine that the ambassadors had not given official support.

"But, you always could have come to me, even more than you have done."

It was difficult for me to say now: "Yes, but the Turks would have resented that even more." (Each of our visits to the Russian ambassador was in the Turkish papers.) I answered that I had discussed a

lot also with Gulkevich and Toukholka, that I had shown the former, for instance, the complete draft instruction before presenting it.

"Well," Mr. de Giers said, "It also does not matter at all in practice; officially, we only know the note of 8 February." And opening a portfolio he took out for a moment the famous note, the original, signed by the Grand Vizir and Gulkevich (Mr. de Giers being temporarily absent).

Quickly, with a smile, the document was put away again by the ambassador . . . for from those signatures the very great part played by Russia in this affair became apparent. The note had not yet been officially signed, and officially presented to the ambassadors, "perhaps after the prorogation of the chamber," Mr. de Giers said.

"With that list of senior officials Ostrorog has deceived you; it is much too long," the ambassador also said.

I talked now about Ostrorog and asked the ambassador if indeed Ostrorog was a man of much importance.

"With us he is of no value," he answered. "Bauman is of no value either; he has strongly protested the placement of the gendarmerie under the inspector-general, *mais ça ne vaut pas deux sous*" [but that is not worth a penny].

"But do you know Graves, the inspector-general for administration at the ministry of the interior?"

When I said that I had a most pleasant relationship with Graves and that I valued him highly, Mr. de Giers was most pleased. He too considered a good cooperation with the European specialists at the ministries in Constantinople a guarantee for success.

Mr. de Giers further informed me that he would take care that Talaat would, at our request, present us the note semi-officially.

(Note now the weak reflection of the sinewy talk of Nubar Pasha [comp. 19 June]; so this semi-official act of Talaat had now replaced "the official handling out of the note by the ambassadors to the inspectors-general," as Nubar had wanted it.)

Finally, Mr. de Giers said that this demonstrated how well the Russian envoy in The Hague had informed him (comp. 18 June): "You prefer not to correspond with me, well, then the secretaries can keep my consuls informed. I promise you again that the number of consuls will be increased; they are at your disposal. Remember that I am always ready to help you; we will succeed."

In the evening the chief of reorganization in the juridical domain, Clarke, an English jurist, came to ask me to make a mutual agreement in the same spirit as made with Graves on the fifth, as a result of which no stagnation could arise in the service by the dismissal of officials, to which the inspector-general had the right.

I asked him if I could send him my bills for assessment before the of-



ficial presentation, since they would come into his hands after all, and that in this way we would avoid much writing and disappointment. He agreed with this. He asked me, in his turn, if he could send his bills and plans for reorganization to me for assessment, because in this way it could often become apparent that well-arranged theory would result in difficulties in practice or in slow execution. We completely agreed on the standpoint to be taken by us with regard to the Turkish government, which trusts us foreigners with such important functions.

I thus told him with regard to Armenia that I really also wanted to support the Turkish interests, and would try to help the advance in all respects of the country and the people.

The next day I learned that Clarke had informed the minister of justice about our conversation, and that he had been most pleased with it.

*Ms.:* . . . In the evening at half past nine the English jurist Clarke visited, who has been here now for about three weeks to reorganize the administration of justice. Very bright man, with many illusions and some castles in the air, director of the juridical inspection — he came in fact to make with me the same agreement as with Graves. I let him know the next day that I would be glad to visit the prison.

*Tuesday, 7 July.* Hoff returned from a lunch offered him by Talaat and was very unhappy about the way in which his presence had in fact been ignored; they had only spoken Turkish around him, and no official speech had been made. In spite of this, in the evening papers both the official speeches of Talaat and of Hoff Bey appeared.

*Ms.:* Arranged some affairs and documents for visit tomorrow to Talaat Bey — took Kawas Djoero into service on 6 Lt., costume, nourishment, and clothing.

*Wednesday, 8 July.* I went with Torley Duwel at eleven o'clock to Talaat Bey. As usual the latter was in a very good mood.

"You have proposals for the specialists?" He had in view my proposals made from Holland.

I now started with the agricultural expert, since he was for the time being the most easy to dispense with. This one fell off: the government had a good agriculturist, Talaat Bey said.

Then it was the turn of the engineer Vijverberg, and I told how he had worked in Siam and was an excellent expert in various fields; Talaat now telephoned for a moment, I think to Javid Bey, the minister of finance; I heard him saying "Westenenk Bey" and "Siam." Thereupon he said: "It is all right," and the salary was fixed at 100 Lt. and 25 Lt. traveling costs. The secretary-general Ali Munif, who was present, now wrote down the name and the amounts just mentioned.

"Now the aide-de-camp," Talaat said, "as to Hoff, I will give you a

Turkish officer, a topographer as well, who can then make maps. A Turkish officer can, in addition, better carry out your instructions than a foreigner who does not know the language of the country."

I referred now to article 23 and asked to be allowed to make use of the right given in it to designate a foreigner, and I asked if I could propose a Dutchman. After some discussion this was permitted as well, and I assigned Wolfson. His salary was put at 50 Lt. and 30 Lt. traveling expenses, and he would be given the rank of major.

With regard to the other specialists, Talaat promised to send me the list shortly, but — he said — where the number of Armenians compared with the Mohammedans was little, the principle of equality (art. 8, two last passages of the instruction) could not be applied here. "Imagine, that the gendarmerie suddenly was made half Armenian."

I assented that such a measure would not be correct, but was of the opinion that the specialists were a different case.

"Well," he said, "I will send you the list."

"Preferably as soon as possible," I answered, "for I would like to speak with the candidates and examine them a little." (I said this with emphasis, since I wanted to exercise the right included in the renowned last passage of article 23 of the instruction [comp. 21 May].)

"Ah, *c'est tres bien*" [Oh, that is very good], he said laughing, with a quick look of the *beaux yeux de Talaat* [pretty eyes of Talaat].

"And for my house," I asked, "cannot I get the large building in Erzerum, now very partially used as a hospital? The ground level can be used then for all our offices, the floors for living. With it is a large garden; we can cultivate that to be an example for the population."

Talaat Bey agreed with this and had it put down by Ali Munif; also my request to make available the necessary funds for offices and installation costs.

Concerning the contract of Torley Duwel, he would discuss everything with Ostrorog. I asked, however, to stipulate in the draft contract, which Blehr had already received, that the secretary, just like us, would receive the salary in advance, at the beginning of each month. Talaat also agreed with that; it had therefore again been only a little annoyance by Ostrorog.

Finally, I was obliged to ask him to order the Ottoman Bank to pay us; Hoff had not yet received anything during all this time.

At three o'clock the Grand Vizir would receive Torley Duwel and me. This took place . . . only after we had waited for no less than seven quarters of an hour together with the complete council of ministers.

After casual conversation I asked Torley Duwel to leave us alone, and now plainly asked the Grand Vizir if it was also his wish that the "six months" would remain unchanged in the contract (comp. 24 May), upon which he answered that he considered the amount sufficient, also in case of illness or death. I asked the question, as I do not

like that an affair remains not completely "settled," now I knew at least that Ostrorog had spoken about it after all.

Ms.: At 11 o'clock with Talaat Bey; present, Torley Duwel and Ali Munif, the general-secretary of Talaat Bey. The mood was very good and I told him that I had followed in the papers his travel to Asia Minor, etc. in order to quieten the Greeks gone into exile or expelled, and that he had results from his work. "Yes, these are difficult times . . ."

This one fell off; no, the government had a good agriculturist. "Well, all right," I said. I repeated again that it was not my intention to import Dutch colonists: "I want to work in your, in our, interests . . ."

"*Mon cher Westenenk Bey, nous sommes pauvres.*" "*Oui, mais ce sont nos intérêts, les vôtres et les miens.*" "*Oui, c'est pour cela qui je dis nous sommes pauvres.*" [My dear Westenenk Bey, we are poor. Yes, but they are our interests, yours and mine. Yes, it is therefore that I say we are poor.] . . . Then I asked him again explicitly to have confidence, since I had such good intentions for the government and the country there. "But I am fully confident and we will succeed." "*Insha'Allah,*" I said. So, it was a very successful morning . . . Then we went away again; however, I remained alone with him [the Grand Vizir] for a while in order to ask him the decisive question: is it your wish that the "six months" remain; has Ostrorog spoken about it? — Yes, I consider it sufficient. Also in case of illness or death? But "*vous êtes jeune et fort*" [you are young and strong]. I shrugged my shoulders, tapped at the fez and went. It was the first day that I officially acted as inspector-general, so I had put on the fez, and Torley Duwel wore it as well. This must have made a good impression. The same morning Blehr came to Ostrorog in the official office not wearing a fez. Ostrorog was unfriendly; not very tactful of Blehr if one hopes to obtain something . . .

Thursday, 9 July. In the evening Hoff's secretary Blehr visited me in order to tell me that the Norwegians had learned from Torley Duwel and Pastermajian that Talaat Bey had allowed me a Dutch inspector of public works and a Dutch officer, and that Hoff had fallen from the clouds . . . he who thought to obtain so much more than me by his efforts never to be unfriendly.

"Yes," Blehr said, "Hoff is a good man, but in Christiana he has already said to me: 'You must never say no to Talaat.' But now I understand everything better. At our first meeting you said, '*c'est trop fort*' [that is too much] (2 July, last sentence), when we told you that Hoff had accepted a Turkish officer. Now I realize that. His idea is to remain anyhow correct with the government in all cases before the departure, and once there, you can do all sorts of things. I have now advised Mr. Hoff," Blehr continued, "to make a cabinet affair of it and he said that he would now show his teeth."

It was difficult for me to discuss Hoff's attitude extensively with Blehr, but only said: "Mr. Hoff has preferred to go his own way, and I don't want to hold him in that."

Blehr further said that it was such a pity that Hoff was unable to express himself properly in a foreign language and concerning that aide-de-camp, he said, "you should know that he has had difficulties with an officer whom he had promised that function. And now you are permitted such an officer of your own nationality."

Ms.: . . . Torley Duwel went to town with several instructions. He returned in the evening with news:

- 1) that General Hawker had arrived at the Hotel Tokatljan and that Torley Duwel had invited him tomorrow for lunch with me; all right;
- 2) that Ali Munif had looked surprised when he entered in order to ask him some things for me; that I will have the list of candidates on Sunday; that a telegram would be sent immediately to Erzerum for the house; that I would be able to have my salary at my disposal on Saturday, etc.;
- 3) Arranged with Graves and Clarke: Monday visit to the prison.

I explained to Blehr that Mr. Hoff had come here before, apparently wanted to go his own way, and that he became angry when I told him what my vision was with regard to the principle of equality in the presence of the Danish envoy and his wife; namely, when I told him that the foreigners should not be counted as non-Mohammedans, since this applies to the sedentary population. That I had been then of the opinion: "Then proceed further alone!" Mood with the Norwegians below zero. I: "Why does Mr. Hoff not go to the Russian ambassador?" Blehr: "Oh, the Turks don't like that!" (What an insight, while those Turks lead him by the nose.) I: "Oh, but it is difficult for Mr. Hoff to go any longer to the Russian ambassador, since he has [Monday after my visit] told him that everything went so well that he hoped to be ready Tuesday last, *because* that lunch was given!"

On Tuesday Talaat had offered Hoff a lunch. He was sitting on his right side, between Talaat and the minister of public works. Only soda water was drunk and Talaat hardly spoke to Hoff, all the time being busy with others, everything in Turkish, no speeches, nothing. All terribly ill-mannered. But the afternoon papers carried speeches by Talaat and Hoff!! Lunch took place in Le Cercle d'Orient and was finished very soon . . .

*Friday, 10 July.* General Hawker, inspector of the gendarmerie at Trebizond, with whom I had already corresponded in a most pleasant way, was in Constantinople en route to England and had postponed his furlough in order to be able to inform me about the situation in my sector. He gave me an unfavorable picture of that situation: the gen-

darmes did all kinds of special services, weakening the force of the corps (escorting the mail, guarding the prisons, using gendarmes for the *Dette Publique* [Public Debt], salt monopoly and tobacco monopoly), and the payment was very irregular and several months behind, so that in many families of gendarmes misery was prevalent.

(In May General Bauman had already complained to me that this English inspector had telegraphed directly to the minister of finance for money in order to be able to pay his gendarmes.)

I promised Hawker that we would try to have the escorting of the mail for protecting the money shipments cancelled by establishing a transfer system, and as for the prisons, a separate staff should be established. Because of the large gang of smugglers it was preferable indeed to use the gendarmes with regard to the salt monopoly and the tobacco monopoly. Hawker wanted to hand over permanent gendarmes to the state monopoly, but its officials could not give sufficient military guidance.

Deeds, an Englishman, who speaks excellent Turkish and works under Graves at the ministry of the interior (formerly captain of the gendarmerie), was present at this conversation, and promised special treatment of these matters.

Ms.: . . . "Examined" several Armenian candidates. Then came General Hawker of the gendarmerie at Trebizond, with Clarke and Captain Deeds . . .

*Saturday, 11 July.* Hoff "showed his teeth"; that is, he now also asked for an aide-de-camp of his own nationality and got it. Now a great satisfaction prevailed among the Norwegians at his "victory." Torley Duwel and Blehr signed their contract.

Ms.: . . . Torley Duwel insisted again on payment of my salary at the Ottoman Bank. He has met Talaat, who promised to send tomorrow, if possible, the list of candidates of the government.

*Sunday, 12 July.* Received the list of candidates from Talaat Bey. On the request of the American ambassador, Mr. Morgenthau, I had an interesting meeting with him.

I have told Talaat to be cautious with Christians; they are more united than one is conscious of. As a Jew I say to you: don't touch one hair of a Christian; you will get all the lot of them on your neck.

Ms.: Again spoke with some candidates and interviewed. In the morning I paid a visit, at his request, to the American Ambassador Morgenthau — with Cator, the judge. Typical American: "In former days our country had attracted the best and most energetic elements from the whole world. How we would like to contribute to education — Carnegie has made money available to make the different religions in the Balkans live peacefully with one another"; his opinion had been

asked for. Cator and I did not think the time had come yet, but it may be possible. He talked animatedly about the Philippines, which would be made independent after 20 years, perhaps after 30! — further about agriculture, American ploughs — American educational system in the Philippines — "How old are you? 42 — oh, what a nice age, I envy you for the work that is awaiting you!" — I told him that one of the ambassadors had told me: "*Les Turcs ne veulent pas regarder par les fenêtres de leur histoire*" [The Turks don't want to look through the windows of their history]. In their opinion that was very correct — the next day I learned (from Haidar Bey, assistant to Clarke) that under Abdul Hamid the teaching of the history of Turkey was not permitted. The children would then see that Turkey had regressed very much and one would be able to judge his (bad) actions.

Morgenthau also said: "I have told Talaat: *I as a Jew say to you: don't offend. Don't touch one hair of a Christian, you'll get the whole lot of them (all Christian powers, including America) on your neck.*" He says that *all* Christians have united much more. I suggested: because of the yellow peril? He was not of that opinion. He thought that one *always has to reckon with* the Japanese. I told him that we much preferred to have the Americans in the Philippines as a buffer against Japan.

*Monday, 13 July.* Studied at Clarke's his juridical statistics, drawn up by him and his assistant. After that visited one of the prisons with him

... Graves was most pleased with Talaat's list of candidates. "It speaks strongly in favor of the government," he said, "that in general it wants to give you such competent men."

With a view to the principle of equality (art. 8 of the instruction), however, also some Armenians had to be proposed as specialists, and for that I had been given a list made up by the patriarchate. Moreover, some candidates of the government did not want to go to Armenia, and in this way changes were made in the list and we made proposals.

*Ms.: ...* Graves was very satisfied with the list of candidates of the government. Remarkable, he said to Leo (de Vignon vanDevelde); they consider Westenenk competent and give him the most competent candidates. It certainly demonstrates that the government is kindly disposed.

Then visited with Clarke the prison in Grande Rue de Péra. Appalling hovels, much filthiness, almost total lack of medical supervision, no compulsory washing of the prisoners, dark, terrible; but I think that the treatment of the prisoners by the staff is not harsh.

Peculiar indeed that Clarke had not yet visited this prison (of preventive detention — there were people who were detained three months and had been heard only once) during his four weeks in service. But he did make enormous statistics; there was a big gap between theory and

practice — I am glad that I gave the impulse to this by my request on 8 July to be allowed to see the prison. What a difference with the prisons in our East. The people are assembled here in "wards," the preventive detainees separated from those sentenced to detention, who lived in the most miserable hovels (dark, stinking). For the women there is a *rather* decent room, toilet *in* the room; however, the women can never go into the open air. It should not be forgotten, however, that the situation *within* the houses in Turkey was not much, perhaps not at all, better. They had been warned beforehand — everywhere a clean-up had been made and a wash; here and there even a stroke of lime had been given. But the rotten air and the darkness could not be dissipated.

Clarke's assistant said that just before Clarke's arrival there had been a report on the bad situation.

In the very dark and extremely musty boys' rooms (usually they are *not* separated) lay a sick (fever) boy rolling and half-raving — in this way it became apparent that no special physician had been assigned. The hospital physician of Istanbul was supposed to come regularly, but did not do so. "*Il faut le pendre*" [he must be hanged], I said. On my question to the assistant if many were dying he said: "You understand, sir, everything is infected here — it is just the point, how can one disinfect under rotting rubbish of wood? What will I find there?" One gets two chunks of bread for the whole day — *nothing* else. But for the preventives the grocer's boy comes every morning — he accepts orders. Such a thing should also exist in Holland, with an opportunity for custom. Holy Dutch Indies, where excellent food is given, not more than two or three times in the week beans, etc.! Every meal different, rice, vegetables, meat, fish or eggs . . . — and a few times a day a bath! And everywhere fresh air and light in the present-day prisons.

*Tuesday, 14 July.* Torley Duwel reported to me that Hoff had told him in confidence: "Talaat has asked me to accept one of his friends as inspector of public works; if I did that I could still get a Norwegian engineer into the bargain, but I must not say anything to Mr. Westenenk."

(I communicated this sample of Eastern *adat* to Toukholka.)

The Armenian mining engineer Balbussian came to report to me that he would be leaving the next day with three American engineers to Erzerum for the Standard Oil Company, which had an oil claim near there. He expected everything from it and wanted to make a pipeline to Trebizond.

For the supply of various machines, etc., he would not make use of the Russian railways, since the Standard Oil Company is a competitor of the Caucasus Petroleum Company, but he would use the transport road Trebizond-Erzerum, hoping that that road would be improved, and he would assist with that. Balbussian had also applied for claims

for copper and coal. He gave me information about good coal, which can be exploited by the population.

Armenia is a bare country; every tree has been cut down to be burned or to be used as building material. One does not plant because of the unrest in the country; also the cattle graze away all growing vegetation and the dung of the cattle must be assembled to make fires in the winter, and so one consumes and burns the dung which is so much needed by the country. Therefore there should be cheap coal available as fuel, so the dung can be used as sorely needed fertilizer.

*Ms.*: . . . In the afternoon, to the Russian ambassador in order to tell him about my proposed plans; he agreed. In the evening, to a reception by Mrs. Morgenthau. Before dinner came the Armenian engineer Balbussian . . .

*Wednesday, 15 July.* We gave Toukholka the list of candidates offered to the government and a copy of my proposals for the appointment of the other officials; one thing or another had been discussed the last day with the Russian ambassador, who completely agreed.

These days the candidates of the government, sent by Talaat, successively reported themselves, so that I could get acquainted with them all.

*Ms.*: . . . Several people of the hotel staff want to go with me, just as in the Dutch Indies!

Received as candidates of the government and "examined" for dragoman Seropé Nourandoukhian [Noradungian] Effendi, and for juridical inspector Moustafa Bey, district judge of Pera. The first does not speak French sufficiently; the second seems to me to be a good candidate.

*Thursday, 16 July.* We received our salaries for July.

During a conversation with Mr. Berj Kerestegian, Armenian chief of the operations service of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, he informed me that the bank had formerly wanted to establish a transfer system in Armenia, but that the merchants were not agreeable to this, being unacquainted with its extensive use. Should I succeed in getting businessmen in Trebizond interested in it, then the bank would be glad to cooperate, and in this way the actual transport of money to Erzerum could be limited (comp. 10 July).

With regard to Armenia, Kerestegian said that he always warned his countrymen against rash actions and too exaggerated demands from the Turkish government. "There are always hot-headed persons and these are dangerous." He spoke, for instance, about the bomb attack on the bank in 1896; he was still young then and worked "upstairs"; it was an incredible audacity, and it had been successful, in spite of all of Abdul Hamid's spies. But what did the Armenians obtain through this



bomb attack? The next day thousands of Armenians were massacred in Constantinople. The Armenian officials of the bank got off relatively well — they were moved to the Ottoman Bank in Egypt — but all Armenian civil servants and officials were dismissed, driven off, and the business of the Armenians was crippled for at least ten years.

I told him my opinion on the work over there in Armenia.

"Excellent . . . tell my countrymen that they should not get involved in politics; let them do two things, which we Armenians are permitted and able to do: work and make money, nothing else. Hot-headed persons are needed for overthrowing governments, but not in Armenia."

*Ms.:* To Constantinople in order to receive salary, etc. After that heard Aziz Bey, governor of Gallipoli, candidate of the government for the post of civil inspector — not reliable, somewhat the type of Marcus, so Jewish, did not want the job as he was going to marry a girl from Constantinople, who did not want to go with him to the wilderness. All sorts of objections. After that the candidate of the government for agriculture, Kiatibian Effendi; too old and too weak . . .

I told him [Kerestajian]: That is right, there are always Armenians who want too much and consequently harm the cause. I therefore also always tell the Armenians: don't expect from me that I will *exclusively* promote the Armenian cause; I want to elevate the country and the people as a whole, because if I am not there anymore for one reason or another, the Turks must not bear a grudge against the Armenians for having been favored constantly; there would then be massacres again and all would be lost. He says: Excellent, Excellency, and tell this to all Armenians, tell them that they only have to do two things: to work and to earn money, no politics and nothing else. One needs hot-headed persons for overthrowing governments, but not for these Armenian reforms.

In the evening Hoff said that Talaat Bey wanted to keep the vali of Bitlis at his post. I prepared my proposals.

*Sunday, 19 July.* A telegraphic invitation from Talaat Bey to attend, next Tuesday, a lunch at the Cercle d'Orient.

*Tuesday, 21 July.* Because of the stories by Hoff (7 July) I was prepared for unpleasant experiences. I was determined to beg permission to speak if only Turkish was spoken, and to express thanks for the interest shown in the Armenian affairs: though I had not understood well what everyone had said, since it was done in a language still unknown to me. Undoubtedly the lively conversation concerned Armenia.

At the head of the staircase I was welcomed by Javid Bey, the minister of finance; on the doorstep Talaat Bey in the company of the ministers of education, post, and telegraph waited for me. Thereupon Talaat had all the deputies from my sector file past me. A fine and ex-

quisite reception. At table I sat on the right of Talaat and opposite the ministers of finance and education; Turkish dishes, no speeches, but pleasant and general conversations.

So there was not the least reason to be discontented; on the contrary, of this lunch, where forty persons were brought together, I have a very pleasant memory.

Ms.: . . . all came to compliment me — nice, exquisite, at the table everything cordial, friendly and nice — no speeches — what a difference from Hoff's experience at lunch.

*Wednesday, 22 July.* Hoff complained about the high price of two guns that a Russian attaché, Foivesine, was to buy for him: frs. 1200 with cartridges.

"But," he said, "it can be a profitable affair, when I leave, since in Armenia large amounts are given for guns, which one cannot get there" (comp. 25 April, last sentence).

Talaat had said to him: Accept now my Armenian candidate (not respected at all by the Armenians), then I will give you . . . afterwards . . . several Norwegian engineers.

This curious agreement was reached by them.

Ms.: In the evening a party given by the American ambassador, masked ball, in costume, ambassador de Giers, and the ambassadors from Italy and Spain were there, Talaat and Halil Bey as well. The Hoff family had not been invited . . .

Talaat Bey had said to him [Hoff]: accept my Armenian candidate for public works (not respected by the Armenians) . . .

*Thursday, 23 July.* In the evening, a party given by the Grand Vizir; sixth anniversary of the Constitution.

Blehr had said to De Vignon "that he did not want to accept any decoration *below* that of a *high officer*, and that De Vignon had to tell Torley Duwel that he should, in his turn, refuse any *below* that of an officer, since he, Blehr, was a diplomat and Torley Duwel not!" From this one may conclude the spirit prevailing among the little Norwegians — that is, Blehr, and through him, Hoff. The two boys are good and ordinary — and, given their opinions on the work and the future, what modesty, too.

Also the tone among them seemed to leave much to be desired. "*Les jumeaux* [Graf and Dahl] *se moquent de Blehr*" [The twins (Graf and Dahl) deride Blehr], says Hoff — and of Blehr he hopes that his mood will improve . . . And that company must, at the command of Hoff, sit each evening in Armenia (in Bitlis!) at the table in dress-coats. Poor devils.

*Friday, 24 July.* Hoff and his Norwegians left on a Russian boat.

Blehr had left with De Vignon Vandeveld the message for Torley

Duwel not to accept a decoration below that of an officer. He, Blehr, would not accept one below that of a high officer, since he was a diplomat . . .

*Ms.*: Hoff left on a Russian boat, was seen off by Leo on our behalf and Pastermajian; nobody else, no deputies, etc.

In the afternoon a very interesting visit of three deputies from Erzerum, one of whom (Turkish) had been a martyr for the Young Turkish movement in 1908. His teeth had been knocked out; he was left 36 days in the midst of winter with 30° frost in a shed without anything to sleep on! He was tortured, his nails were pulled off from his toes, but he had endured and had not said anything. Each day he was beaten almost to death, but fortunately his friend saw him awake again at night, and then he smiled at them. What a hero; those tortures gave him therefore the happiness to have saved his comrades. This man is called Seifoullah Halid.

*Saturday, 25 July.* As agreed upon, I was to have with Talaat a final discussion on the specialists and the budget. I found him very agitated at the Grand Vizir's office.

"*Mille fois pardon* [I am extremely sorry], but it is impossible for me to deal with Armenian affairs now; you know that there are great difficulties, the Austrians are marching on Belgrade and we as neighbors must be on guard. For this reason I am now in a discussion with the Grand Vizir and Enver Pasha and must ask you to come on Monday."

An hour later the Khedive of Egypt was shot and wounded before the Sublime Porte by a fanatical Egyptian and by six o'clock in the evening Serbia had to have answered the celebrated Note of Austria. Beginning of the first act of the World War of 1914.

*Ms.*: . . . Will there be a war? Will Turkey make use of the opportunity to grab back Saloniki from Greece? . . .

*Monday, 27 July.* Talaat Bey, whom I met in the Parliament, agreed with my proposals; after some difficulty I also obtained the appointment of the first Armenian candidate, Nalbandian, *chef du service de la dette publique* [chief of the service of public debt].<sup>23</sup>

*Ms.*: . . . Little time, everything in a hurry, since he [Talaat] was busy with the chamber. He would give the remaining Turkish candidates in two or three days and with regard to the money, a mandate would be given. I asked again: "Give me the hospital; you only have to send 2000 Lt.; we will tell the Turkish deputies from Erzerum what it costs; from you only one word!" "Well, all right, you will have the hospital."

<sup>23</sup>The Westenenk papers contain a list of the specialists attached to Westenenk. Nalbandian was appointed head of the office.

*Saturday, 1 August.* The possibilities of a general war were continually growing. We were very much startled by the news in the papers that our Queen had ordered an immediate mobilization. Everyone understood that this had to have an urgent reason. In the evening the Danish envoy told me that the mobilization had been ordered three days ago.

The situation was threatening from all sides. Major Lange of the German mission under Liman von Sanders said that the Emperor had ordered that all German officers of the mission could return to their country, if there was to be no chance of Turkey joining the fight against Russia. In case this did happen, then the Germans had to continue supporting the Turkish army in order to inflict as much loss as possible on the Russians.

The two officers, attachés of the Austrian embassy, left today in a hurry.

*Ms.:* Nothing yet from Talaat Bey. Torley Duwel therefore went to hear from Ali Munif — not satisfactory, will therefore write a letter tomorrow.

*Sunday, 2 August.* In the following days life was confused.

Conflicting news in the papers about declarations of war. The French warship left, after that the German. All countries mobilized, including Turkey. In the midst of the night the various army and navy officers attached to the embassies left; the mouths of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were mined. The most sensational tidings went round . . . the beginning of the craze of the War of 1914.

*Ms.:* . . . Will Russia, in case of a European war, immediately lay hands on Armenia? Then our future would be completely destroyed. But will Russia have troops left for that? If they marched against Germany they would probably need all their forces. Lange advised us to remain calm for another five or six days here, then we would know all about it. I doubt if all would be settled by that time.

*Wednesday-Friday, 3-7 August.* . . . We are looking for a little house — the hotel is not payable?

On Wednesday, 5 August, Mrs. Hemmingson came and asked if we wanted to put up with her. We did that on Friday, 7 August; in the hotel the last week's bill was presented to me: £900-odd! I paid Lt. 45 and £58, tips. Our furniture was put on a removing van to Amaudkeny . . . it was already dark when we arrived. All prices of victuals had risen; what to do if famine broke out? How will the Turks behave toward the Christians, now that they did not have to reckon with the Great Powers any more? Fortunately, the American ambassador had proposed to send three dreadnoughts in order to care for *all* foreigners here — that would be magnificent. For us it is pleasant here.

Sunday, 9 August. The following very curious communiqué (taken from *Le Jeune Turc* of 9 August):

*Un résumé des faits de guerre*

*L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne nous adresse de Thérapia:*

*10 h. du soir (6 août 1914): le télégramme suivant:*

*les nouvelles répandues ici concernant des revers allemands proviennent de source ennemie et sont mensongères.*

*Les troupes allemandes repoussèrent partout les troupes russes, anéantirent une brigade de cavalerie à Soldau et mirent en fuite une division près d'Insterbourg.*

*La Prusse orientale est libre d'ennemis, les pertes allemandes sont insignifiantes.*

*Un grand nombre de villes russes sont occupées par l'armée allemande.*

*La population polonaise acclame les troupes allemandes avec enthousiasme. La Pologne évacuée par l'armée russe se trouve en révolte.*

*La flotte allemande jusqu'ici indemne menace la mer baltique russe; elle a bombardé Libau avec succès.*

*Le Göben détruisit les bases navales françaises Bone et Philippeville.*

*Liège, forteresse moderne, fut prise en 36 heures, d'assaut. Les troupes allemandes occupèrent Briey dans la Lorraine française.*

*Ambassade d'Allemagne*

Monday, 10 August. I received the following letter:

*Constantinople le 8 aout 1914*

*Chère Excellence*

*Je vous prie de bien vouloir ajourner votre départ, la mobilisation générale, qui comprend aussi les fonctionnaires et les circonstances graves actuelles rendant impossible l'application des réformes sanctionnées.*

*Veuillez croire, chère Excellence, à mes sentiments dévoués*

*(signé:) Talaat*

*[Constantinople, 8 August 1914*

*Dear Excellency*

*I request you please to postpone your departure, since the general mobilization, which also includes the officials, and the present serious circumstances, make the application of the sanctioned reforms impossible.*

*Please believe, dear Excellency, in my feelings of devotion,*

*(signed:) Talaat]*

I immediately applied for an interview for the next day.

Tuesday, 11 August. Talaat Bey explained to me that we were indeed obliged to wait. Now that the whole administration had become military, in Armenia as well, the reforms could not be implemented. He declared, however, the intention to begin immediately, when the situation allowed it. Our salaries would regularly be paid out. When I spoke to him about the dangers for Turkey in case of a war with Russia, he said:

*We, indeed, don't think about beginning one. But one day Russia will be in Constantinople anyhow, if not this time, then another time. Yesterday I spoke with a former Rumanian statesman, and he too had no doubt that*

Russia will one day wipe out all small states between herself and Constantinople. I do very well realize that it is at present a vital question for us.

"It is miserable indeed that England has held up your dreadnoughts; strictly speaking they did not need those."

To my surprise the pretty eyes of Talaat laughed and he said: "*Ça ne fait rien; nous achèterons le Göben et le Breslau*" [That does not matter; we will buy the Göben and the Breslau]. And . . . for a low price. They already are before the Dardanelles; they were lost for Germany anyhow.

"Is it true," I asked, "that there has been a tension between Turkey and Russia?" (I knew that in the Russian embassy everything had been packed.)

"Yes, they have asked us for an explanation as to why we continue to keep the officers of the German mission, but I have been able to answer that in our navy we have also kept the English officers."

Ms.: . . . Talaat was very kind. Of my questions he answered that the situation would probably last for months, that we were obliged to wait, since everything was under military administration, also in Armenia; that the Turkish government, however, intends to begin as soon as possible and that he therefore urgently requested me to stay here waiting ("For you are here now as good as in The Hague!") — *that the salary would be regularly paid out* . . .

Talaat was interested in my firm opinion that Germany's industry could not bear a war for three months; again and again he returned to it.

"And what does Holland do?"

"Remain strictly neutral," I said, "I can assure you that the Dutch are a people who stand firm on what they have said — when England violates the neutrality, then we go against England, and the same way also against Germany."

"How are you with respect to the Germans and the English?"

"We are more for the English!"

"So you remain neutral; that may be very difficult for Holland" . . . The Göben which we had seen in May as hyper-dreadnought of the Germans, giving parties, dinner in Pera Palace, now in Turkish hands! How can this be: a razor in the hands of a monkey . . .

Since Sunday the 2nd a great tension between Russia and Turkey has prevailed — but the crisis was on the eighth — the family de Giers was busily packing; but that stopped on the ninth. Was the tension over by then, or was there nothing more to pack? Russia asked Turkey for an explanation regarding the mobilization and the keeping of the German officers. But Talaat told me that he had easily been able to give an answer with regard to the last point, for the English officers of the fleet had all been kept on as well.

Everywhere one sees mobilized troops marching — poor fellows, they *had* to bring food with them for five days, and *after that* would hardly get anything! The day before yesterday 400 men were sent back after five days, after being told that they were not needed yet.

They did not even have enough guns — new barrels were put on old guns. That mobilization was only for getting money. For one could buy oneself off for 45 Lt. and the Christians, knowing that they would be put in front at assaults, did anything to bungle together that 45 Lt. and buy themselves off.

And the untrained navy had to suddenly operate the Göben! The purchase of those ships would indeed be a dodge (to use the words of the Queen) of von Wangenheim, Liman von Sanders and Enver Pasha.

*Wednesday, 12 August.* The Göben was to be called Yavuz Sultan Selim, and the Breslau, Medilli.

The captain of the Dutch ship *Minerva* said, however, that the whole "purchase" could indeed be a trick in order to get the German ships into the Black Sea.

It became apparent that both ships were "hit" by the pursuit in the Mediterranean in such a way that they had to undergo a large repair; for weeks they were repaired in a remote bend of the Sea of Marmara.

*Ms.: Thursday, 13 August . . .* It was said in diplomatic circles that Russia had resented the purchase of the Göben and the Breslau — no wonder! . . .

*Tuesday, 18 August.* The Göben must have had such English bullet-holes that it had to be repaired; it accordingly drifted about near the Prince Island, and may not be shown yet to the public.

To the Ottoman Bank. They had *still* forgotten to give orders for the payment of the salaries.

*Wednesday, 19 August.* In spite of Talaat's declaration, I had difficulty in getting paid; the reason was that they had decided only to pay out the salary and not the indemnity for traveling costs.

The Dutch envoy told me that he had a conversation with the German ambassador von Wangenheim and that he had said: "Behind each Turkish gun at the Dardanelles stands a German gunner."

It has become apparent that there were many more German officers in the Turkish army than were allowed for the mission.

*Ms.: . . .* Went to see the Dutch envoy, who had been completely wrongly informed (by Schmoleck?) and thought that I had very little success with regard to Armenia — that it was all a mistake! Very coolly I convinced him of the opposite. I had lunch in the hotel, he came some time later and joined me; at another table were the ministers of Spain and Denmark, who also spoke with me. . . . Everywhere were German officers and Liman von Sanders had become the commandant of Constantinople.

*Thursday, 20 August.* Received salary.

To all appearances the war would still last a very long time, so we were beginning to wonder if it would not be advisable to await the events in Holland. I considered this more or less comparable to leaving one's post; Torley Duwel did not agree with me and suggested that we ask for advance pay from the Turkish government, which, however, did not appear to me to be advisable, since this would never be paid.

Our envoy also had no objections against leaving for Holland and the discussion of this with Javid Bey, who during Talaat Bey's absence looked after his functions.

The Russian ambassador also shared my opinion that I should not leave before the return of Talaat, who was in Asia Minor in order to personally reassure the Greeks, who had been expelled here and there or had fled without serious reason.

Mr. de Giers also said that the situation was very difficult indeed. Russia did not want war, but Germany almost daily tried to incite Turkey to action, which indeed would compel the Triple Entente to declare war. The latter had decided, however, to avoid the war as much as possible.

Also the suspension of the reforms in Armenia by the Turkish government totally without the ambassadors' knowledge would be considered as a provocation.

Goulkevitch said: "Perhaps there will come a time when Talaat will urgently request you to go to Armenia."

What could he have meant by that?

The ambassadors said that trains full of German military were conveyed; the guns in Kawak at the mouth of the Bosphorus were also served by German gunners. The Guben and Breslau ordered much pork, certainly not for the *Mohammedan* sailors. A sealed train, so completely secure from inquisitive glances, has conveyed German artillery, etc., etc.

At the Nestlé Company an order of f9000 for milk for the Göben had been given, the bill being paid . . . by the German ambassador.

*Ms.:* Received salary. Kerestegian told me that I would only get around 20 Lt. in gold, the rest in paper. I then asked to see the director Tristam, an Englishman, and told him that I was here with the children, that we probably had to leave all together, seven persons, and that I would need around 250 Lt. in gold. Fortunately, I could persuade him — got 250 in a small bag, but was not allowed to check it, for at the same time other "excellencies" were brushed off. I went very happily with the gold to Hemmingson — the 150 Lt. in paper money we needed for bills.

Mr. Tristam told me that the Göben, having to flee from the English, had to burn everything combustible; that the flue almost had been melted, everywhere holes, bridge completely destroyed. The



Breslau had its main gun completely shot into pieces; stood upright in the air! For this reason they were not allowed to be shown to the people and they remained lying in secret in the neighborhood of the Prince Islands.

*Sunday, 6 September* . . . Gone into service: Djoero, 8 July 1914; Karabet, 10 July 1914; Sois, 17 August, 1914.

*Monday, 7 September.* The news that Talaat will receive me tomorrow at three o'clock.

*Tuesday, 8 September.* Only some days after his return I was able to meet Talaat Bey. He was very agitated. "We have just had a cabinet council about you and we have had to decide to offer all of you half of your salaries. We cannot pay it."

I answered to that this manner of acting was not according to the contract.

"That is correct, but we cannot pay it."

"You will certainly give me time to think about it?"

"Sure; of course."

"Would you object if I go on leave to Holland in order to take away my family?"

"Surely not, you can also stay here; I could give you and Hoff, whom I have already recalled as well, a few rooms *pour préparer la chose*" [to prepare the affair].

I told Torley Duwel, who was waiting for me outside the minister's room, that I was now thinking of returning under protest to Holland and not accepting a halving of my salary.

I decided to go immediately to the Dutch envoy to put the affair before him as a Dutch citizen and to ask him: "Do you consider it advisable and do you want to take action in this affair for and with me?"

The envoy answered: "Yes, in general I will, of course, but I have at present such a bad relationship with the Turkish government because of this question with the Dutch ships, which have been half plundered by the Turkish soldiers and against which I have strongly protested. My assistance would not be of any help to you."

"That is at present not the most important point for me, although I understand that it would be unpleasant for you not to have any success. But what is your advice?"

"My advice is: don't accept, ask full salary, and possibly address yourself to the competent judge."

*Ms.:* I began to ask Talaat, who was very agitated from the cabinet council of the Grand Vizir, if it was true that Chalib Bahtiar, my inspector of public education, had been reappointed director of public education in Adrianople, as was written in the *Stamboul*. "Yes," Talaat said, "we have just decided in the cabinet council only to offer

all of you half of the salary; we cannot pay it!" Second, provocation of the Great Powers with regard to Armenia . . .

Went immediately to the Dutch envoy . . . But what is your advice? Don't accept, ask full salary and otherwise address yourself to the tribunal. Which one? Yes, there is such a tribunal for Europeans here. Also against the *government*? Yes, I cannot think of the name now . . .

I told the envoy to visit the Russian minister tomorrow. We warned Toukholka.

*Wednesday, 9 September.* I informed the Russian ambassador about what had happened and told him that it was my intention not to accept half of the salary and to return under protest to Holland.

Mr. de Giers replied that, under normal conditions, he would be obliged to address the Grand Vizir and take care that one adhered to the contract, but that this was not possible at present, and that it would not help at all, now that the Turks were all excited with ideas of war.

"I cannot do anything at the moment, but I assure you that one day accounts will be squared with Turkey, including your affair. As ambassador I should be in complete agreement with you and I should advise you to refuse. But in the given circumstances I am obliged to advise you not to refuse, and to await the course of events."

"But," I said, "it is an inclined plane; at present they are offering me half of my salary, the next month they will be giving me one-quarter, etc., and that I surely cannot risk."

"But are you able, if need be, to live for months without getting payment from the Turkish government?"

"In case of need I am, but I think it quite dishonorable to run the risk of receiving less every time. I would prefer to tell them to keep their money, and that I will wait."

[He said:]

You are right, but you can really not do that. Refusing the salary would be considered by the Turks as a renunciation of the function, *refuser votre poste* [to refuse your post]; we would then not have an inspector-general anymore, and the whole affair would have to begin all over again. So the Powers would require from you that you don't break off and don't create the possibility that the Turkish government could consider the bond with you as broken.

So I must advise and request you to accept the half, but add to it: "*mais vous me devez l'argent* [but you owe me the money], later on we will arrange everything; I make you responsible for that."

At the moment I cannot do anything for you, though I should act on your behalf. There is no objection, though, that you await the events in Holland. Once you are there and you don't want to accept, for one reason or another, further payment from the Turks, then you can do as you please; but to refuse at present to accept the half, you cannot. Before which court would the Dutch envoy have liked your claim against the Turkish government to be brought? There is no such court and if there were one, then the Turks would abolish it just as they have done with the capitulations.

As appears from the literally reproduced conversation, Mr. de Giers became increasingly peremptory while speaking and it became evident that as a representative of the Powers, who had wanted the reforms in Armenia, he did not allow that I break off the bond with the Turkish government.

We agreed to deal with the affair in this spirit. The Russian ambassador had spoken of *l'abolition des capitulations* [the abolishment of the capitulations], for the Turkish government had informed the ambassadors and the envoys that day by letter (I saw a copy in the hands of the Spanish envoy), that the capitulations, the advantages granted to foreigners over the "Ottoman subjects" in the fields of police and justice, post and payment of taxes, had been abolished. Notwithstanding existing commercial treaties, the Turks considered the moment favorable to part with this invidious burden. Everywhere this act was celebrated as a great victory; at night everywhere there was music, festivities, illuminated gondolas, etc.

Ms.: . . . Yes, Mr. de Giers said, it is of course unprecedented — it is again a provocation. But they have completely lost their heads; they are like children who are set at liberty — the cord gets loose more and more and the little children dance. But I can assure you that accounts will be squared, yours included.

*Thursday, 10 September.* Talaat Bey, who received me at three o'clock, was very cheerful, though he just had a fight for an hour, as he told me, with the American ambassador about the capitulations.

"I don't think," he said, "that we will have difficulties with the economic part of the affair, but they all object to the jurisdiction. Well, we must profit from the opportunity *apres la guerre il y aura une liquidation et si la Turquie est estimée encore de quelque valeur . . .* [after the war there will be a settlement and if Turkey is still valued in some way . . .] then some advantage will remain."

I now said to Talaat Bey in the presence of Torley Duwel: "*Je suis convaincu que le gouvernement, comme toute l'Europe, traverse pour le moment une crise économique, de sorte que le gouvernement se voit obligé de payer la moitié de nos traitements. En même temps les contrats restent intacts et en pleine vigueur . . . n'est-ce pas?*" [I am convinced that the government, as the whole of Europe, at the moment is going through an economic crisis, so that the government sees itself obliged to pay half of our salary. At the same time the contracts remain unimpaired and in full force . . . isn't that so?]

"*Certainement*" [Certainly].

"*Alors j'accepte*" [Then I accept].

"*Je vous remercie infiniment*" [I thank you very much], Talaat said, and the pretty eyes of Talaat laughed their prettiest laugh.

Talaat had no objections at all against my awaiting the war events in Holland.

"So I await there your orders to return?"

"You can imagine that yourself; if the situation has improved and we demobilize, then we begin reforming, and consequently you return."

"So I will await your reports. I will authorize the Dutch consul to remain 'in contact' for me with the government" (for receiving the salary, I meant).

"All right," Talaat said, "you also have your envoy here, though, and we have our envoy in The Hague."

The mood of Talaat expressed a surprising satisfaction at the attained "success," the abolishment of the capitulations.

One got the impression from the Turks that after this "victory" was gained, the desire to fight had been diminished considerably. It has been maintained that from the Russian side the advice had been given to go along with the abolishment, since one knew that the result would be to obtain a considerable cooling down of the bellicosity against Russia, while the abolishment could not but be very unpleasant for the Germans and the Austrians as well.

Ms.: I had asked Torley Duwel when Talaat could receive me: three o'clock. I told Mr. Willebois about our decision.

Yes, let it be like that — if you had refused, you would also not be able to go on leave.

A telegram from Minister Loudon arrived: first word must be Westenenk, remainder of numbers not clear — I asked him to telegraph again. At three o'clock to Talaat . . .

"Do you object that I pass the time in Holland?" "No — You still have there your envoy Aristarchy?" "*Malheureusement oui*" [Unfortunately yes]. "*Il est toujours malade!*" [He is always ill?] "*Oui, malade et inactif*" [Yes, ill and inactive] . . .

Salary, please, before the thirteenth — I will arrange this on Saturday with you (Torley Duwel) — the latter also asked this time for 100 Lt., which I supported. My poor secretary, I said laughing; yes, he said, we are all of us poor; I only draw half as well.

My main impression of this visit was: because of the mobilization one has dared to take this step, probably incited by Germany — one considered it an enormous victory — and one is not in need anymore of a war.

Informed Mr. Willebois and bade him farewell . . .

*Friday, 11 September.* Tried in vain to meet the Russian ambassador. Torley Duwel and I did find, however, the German ambassador. Mr. von Wangenheim immediately started to inveigh against the Turks and the situation.

"The Turks are mad that they have forced through the capitulation in this way; they are capable of anything now."

I received from Tabritz the official news from our consul that the Russian officers have let it be known that they will kill the women and children. What will the Turks do on hearing this: there will be murdering everywhere. I was assured that the Turkish army of Kawak will come down on the Christians at the Bosphorus, if Russia or England tried to force the Dardanelles.

It is the end — at present one already imports barbarians — gone is all "culture" — wherever the sympathy is, it is horrible. And what will happen now in Tabritz is the result of the action of the Belgian government which has armed the population. That was the beginning of all barbarism; after that everything was possible.

It will even come to pass that letters of marque and reprisal are distributed. Why should slavery not come again, so that man is ruled again by the whip? It is the end of everything. "*Wir werden gehängt, ich auch*" [We will be hanged, me too].

He agreed that I had accepted half of the salary and that I would await the war news in Holland.

*Ms.: . . . Visit to the German ambassador von Wangenheim . . . From Tabritz we now have official news from the consulate that the Russian officers have let it be known that they will kill German women and children (!) . . . My final impression was that the Germans had an enormous blow in France and he [Wangenheim] wanted to convince us that the Germans had not incited [the Turks] to abolish the capitulations. One realized that one had gone too far, now that the fighting spirit of the Turks had disappeared.*

*Monday, 14 September.* In the morning I drew half of our salary; leaving at 2:30 hrs. on the Dacia to Constanza. Travelled through Bucharest, Prédéal, Budapest, Vienna and Berlin to Holland.

*Ms.: In the morning half of the salary, 200 Lt., drawn. Torley Duwel drew 2 x 50 Lt.; that is, from half September until half October in advance, since he would like so much to have some cash . . .*

*Saturday, 19 September.* Arrived in Deventer.

*Ms.: Monday, 23 November.* . . . Made this week an extract from my diary with regard to the Armenian mission, in order to lodge with the minister of foreign affairs and to serve as a base for a note on the affair — sent everything to Torley Duwel. ■